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ver the past decade, the financial world has been revolutionizedOby an exponential increase in the use of complex financial tools
known as derivatives. The term "derivatives" is used to describe
a diverse and rapidly evolving array of privately negotiated over-the-
counter (OTC) and exchange-traded financial instruments.' These so-
phisticated instruments are, in essence, financial contracts whose values
are linked to (or "derived" from) the value of one or more underlying
assets, such as stocks, bonds, or commodities.2 Derivatives have most
often been employed as a sort of "insurance," protecting investors' posi-
tions through allocation of risk, but the instruments have also been used
to generate profits through speculation on market positions.
While the simpler components of these instruments have existed for
hundreds of years, relatively recent innovations in computer and commu-
nications technology, coupled with advances in finance theory, have pro-
pelled these complex tools into the mainstream of the increasingly
mathematics-based world of finance. 3 These improvements in theory and
technology spurred unprecedented growth in the derivatives market by
facilitating the customization of instruments to meet market players' de-
mand for sophisticated risk-management tools, thereby helping investors
compete in the increasingly globalized (and more volatile) financial
market.4
The majority of growth in the derivatives market has come about since
the mid-1980s, when the use of OTC derivatives began to catch on. To-
1. Daniel P. Cunningham et al., An Introduction to OTC Derivatives, in SWAPS AND
OTHER DERIVATIVES IN 1994, at 1 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
B4-7062, 1994).
2. See Andrew Freeman, Damned Derivatives, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 10, 1993, at 9;
Randall Smith & Steven Lipin, Beleaguered Giant: As Derivatives Losses Rise, Industry
Fights to Avert Regulation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1994, at Al.
3. See Bernard J. Karol & Mary B. Lehman, Equity Derivatives, REV. SEC. & COM-
MODITIES REG., July 1, 1994, at 121. Advances in theory and technology now permit inves-
tors to isolate and better evaluate the risk components of a complex transaction, and
derivative instruments can then be employed to address these risks. Id at 122; see also
Kenneth A. Froot et al., A Framework for Risk Management, HARV. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec.
1994, at 91; Isaac B. Lustgarten & Junling Ma, Derivative Activities of Banks and Bank
Holding Companies, REV. BANKING & FIN. SERVICES, Dec. 8, 1993, at 1 (noting that since
the 1980s, derivatives have grown dramatically in scale, diversity, and complexity); Mar-
gery Waxman, The Lesson of Orange County: It Takes a Crisis to Focus Public Policy on the
Need for Adequate Disclosure of Risk, 63 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 943 (Dec. 19, 1994)
(noting that the over-the-counter derivatives market has experienced a 40% growth rate
each year during the past 10 years, with countless numbers of institutions of all sizes and
levels of sophistication now entering the market). Figures reported by the General Ac-
counting Office indicate that the use of derivatives between 1989 and 1992 grew 145%. Id.;
John Greenwald, The Devil's in the Derivatives, TirE, Oct. 10, 1994, at 54.
4. Leo Melamed, In Defense of Derivatives, BARRON'S, Mar. 7, 1994, at 67. Melamed
is the past chairman of the Chicago Mercantile Board.
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day, the notional value 5 of the derivatives market is an estimated sixteen
trillion dollars, more than double the gross domestic product of the
United States.6 In the words of one commentator, the financial world has
now entered the "Age of Derivatives," as it moves from "long-term hedg-
ing to on-line risk management." '7
Not everyone, however, is bullish on the widespread use of derivatives.
Many believe that the rapid movement of derivatives to the forefront of
financial markets has brought with it the potential for a market disaster
of systemic proportion; one that could make the recent savings and loan
debacle seem tame by comparison.8 In addition to the sheer magnitude
of the derivatives market, a number of other factors raise legitimate con-
cerns, including the interrelation of markets and institutions derivatives
create, inadequate disclosure of risks to investors, inadequate assessment
of risk by institutional managers who lack the expertise required to truly
understand these complicated instruments, and an increasing pressure on
fund managers to produce profits through speculation. 9
Over the past few years, the debate has intensified between those en-
joying the benefits of derivatives and those who feel the instruments
threaten global financial stability. The debate eventually reached the
floor of the U.S. Congress, as spectacular, high-profile, derivatives-re-
5. See John A. Lindholm, Note, Financial Innovation and Derivatives Regulation-
Minimizing Swap Credit Risk Under Title V of the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992,
1994 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 73 (1994). The term "notional value" refers to the value of the
assets underlying the derivatives contracts. This method of measuring the size of the deriv-
atives market is not entirely satisfactory, as it fails to reflect the streams of income the
parties to the agreement are bound to exchange. Id. at 77 n.18. Notional value has, how-
ever, become the standard measure of the size of the derivatives market simply because no
other method is so readily calculated. Another estimation, though seldom employed, is the
cost of replacing a defaulting counterparty to a derivatives contract with a new
counterparty. Waxman, supra note 3, at 944.
6. Carol J. Loomis, The Risk That Won't Go Away, FORTUNE, Mar. 7, 1994, at 43.
Note that notional value is essentially an approximation, and estimates may vary widely.
The point, however, is not whether $10 trillion or $16 trillion is the more accurate estima-
tion, but that the derivatives market is so large as to be measured in the trillions in the first
place. One recent Wall Street Journal estimate put the market at $35 trillion, more than
twice the amount estimated by the GAO. Experts point out that the true value of the
market is impossible to pinpoint because so many derivatives transactions are traded in
private OTC deals. See Derivatives Market Put at $35 Trillion, AM. BANKER, Aug. 26, 1994,
at 20.
7. Melamed, supra note 4, at 67.
8. See Ronald Fink, Shadow Boxing, FrN. WORLD, Oct. 25, 1994, at 92. "[B]ecause
each derivative transaction typically leverages an investment and brings more than one
customer into the deal, the possibility of a domino effect is thought to be much higher in
this marketplace than in those for other financial instruments." Id. at 95; see also Henry
T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise
of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1460-1461 (1993) (noting that financial
industry players from both the private and public sectors worry that a failure in the over-
the-counter derivatives market could trigger a new banking crisis); Lindholm, supra note
5, at 84-86. The size of the derivatives market, coupled with the fact that approximately
seven financial institutions account for nearly all of the exposure of American banks, leads
some regulators to fear a ripple effect. Under this scenario, a major bank or banks might
accumulate losses, default on payments, and set off an interbank financial crisis affecting
the entire market. Id.
9. Waxman, supra note 3, at 943.
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lated losses drew the regulatory attention of several congressional com-
mittees. The principal players in this controversy now include derivatives
market users and trading organizations, federal regulatory agencies, and
the U.S. Congress.
The market users and derivatives trading organizations argue that the
industry is already adequately regulated, and that any additional congres-
sionally sponsored regulatory action would be not only unnecessary, but
devastating to both issuers and users of the instruments. 10 Surprisingly,
the majority of federal regulatory entities-including the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), Federal Reserve Board (FRB), Commod-
ity Futures Trade Commission (CTFC), and the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC)-agree that the current regulatory framework,
properly applied, is sufficient to safeguard the financial system and the
U.S. taxpayer from a derivatives-induced financial crisis." Standing in
sharp contrast to the positions taken by industry players and many fed-
eral regulators are a number of key members of Congress, particularly
those serving on the House Banking Committee.' 2 Anxious to avoid an-
other savings and loan-type regulatory disaster, and spurred on by a se-
ries of highly publicized losses in the derivatives market, 13 the last two
congressional sessions witnessed more than a half-dozen derivatives-re-
lated bills, each aimed at clamping down on the derivatives market
through increased regulation and oversight.
B. PURPOSE OF COMMENT
This Comment examines derivative instruments on two distinct levels.
The first section serves as a primer on the nature and function of deriva-
tives, explaining what they are as well as how and by whom they are used.
In spite of the important role derivatives now occupy in the financial mar-
kets, the instruments are, in general, poorly understood, even among
many industry participants. The purpose of the first section, then, is to
provide a basic understanding of derivatives in language which is compre-
hensible to the financial market layperson. The second section is a review
of the explosive development of the derivatives market, looking at the
important role it has come to play in today's global financial markets, and
examining how changes in the economic environment recently resulted in
10. Id.
11. Id. at 944. The regulators are hesitant to endorse additional regulations that might
negatively impact the value of derivatives contracts linking many of the world's largest
financial institutions. Id. Note that the term "derivative" applies to a variety of financial
instruments, some of which are classified as securities (and thus fall under the oversight of
the SEC) and some of which are not (and thus are regulated by entities other than the
SEC). Karol & Lehman, supra note 3, at 126.
12. Waxman, supra note 3. Representatives Henry B. Gonzalez (D-Texas) and Jim
Leach (R-Iowa), the past and current chairs of the committee, have been vocal advocates
of increased oversight of the derivatives industry. Prior to the mid-term elections of 1994,
Leach and Gonzalez had introduced a bill seeking greater regulatory accountability and
oversight of the market. Leach Says House Banking Ready to Tackle Derivatives, Powers,
and Consolidation, 63 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 906 (Dec. 19, 1994).
13. For a discussion of these high-profile derivatives-related losses, see infra part III.C.
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spectacular losses for investors who, knowingly or not, invested in deriva-
tives. The section also examines the various arguments put forth in the
debate over regulating the derivatives market and explores the potential
character of derivatives legislation, which will almost certainly be passed
in the near future.
II. DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS PRIMER
A. DERIVATIVES DEFINED
In spite of the magnitude of the derivatives market and the principal
position they now occupy in the global financial system, the instruments
themselves, how they are used, and the risks that accompany their use are
poorly understood by even the most sophisticated investors. 14 What,
then, is a derivative? A derivative is a financial instrument that market
traders use to hedge risk and, in some cases, to speculate on market
movements. Reduced to its essence, the instrument is simply a "side bet"
between two parties on the value of some asset. 15 The contract between
the parties is called a "derivative" because the value of the contract is tied
to (or "derived" from) the value of the underlying asset; as the value of
the underlying asset fluctuates, so too does the value of the derivative
contract. While the term derivatives generally encompasses both mort-
gage-backed securities and collateralized mortgage obligations, 16 the
14. See Saul Hansell & Kevin Muehring, Why Derivatives Rattle the Regulators, INSTI-
TUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1992, at 49, 50. Former New York Federal Reserve Bank
Chairman E. Gerald Corrigan determined, after speaking with various bankers under his
supervision, that many did not understand derivatives or the magnitude of possible losses
involved with their use. Id; see also Loomis, supra note 6, at 49. Many regulators feel that
bank CEOs and board members simply do not understand how their own organizations are
using derivatives. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) recently sent
national banks a set of guidelines emphasizing the role of the banks' boards in responsibly
managing the risks inherent in the use of derivatives, yet it is clear that many board mem-
bers lack the expertise to fully understand the issues. The CEO of one large bank, unable
to respond to a basic question regarding his bank's derivatives portfolio, admitted to being
in "over [his] head." Id; Waxman, supra note 3. "There is no doubt that the complexity of
[derivative transactions] has made it more difficult for even the most senior management
to understand or evaluate the benefits or the risks associated with using these derivatives."
Id.
15. Hansell & Muehring, supra note 14, at 50; see also Karol & Lehman, supra note 3,
at 121. Derivatives contracts amount to little more than bets on the direction of a market
made by players in a "zero-sum game." Unlike an ordinary stock market transaction, the
loss incurred by one party to a derivatives contract, less transaction costs, is the gain real-
ized by the counterparty. Id.
16. Mortgage-backed securities and collateralized mortgage obligations are financial
instruments that make up the secondary mortgage loan and capital markets. The origina-
tor of mortgage loans (such as a commercial bank, mortgage banker, or savings and loan
institution) will often place groups of loans having similar characteristics in a pool and
"securitize" them. The loans, then, become the collateral for securities which the origina-
tor or loan assignee issue and sell in the capital markets. These mortgage-backed securities
are sold to attract funds from investors who would otherwise be unlikely to invest directly
in an individual mortgage. The funds are then used by the issuer for further mortgage
lending. In the standard mortgage-backed security, each investor is the holder of a pro-
rata share of all scheduled payments on the securitized mortgages. However, just as the
OTC market innovated new products to satisfy the customized needs of individual inves-
tors, issuers of mortgage-backed securities began to divide securities issues into classes (or
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term is predominately used to describe four types of financial instru-
ments: swaps, options, forwards, and futures.17 These instruments gener-
ally fall into one of four categories: foreign exchange, interest rate,
commodity, and equity derivative instruments. 18
Derivative transactions are actually two-party contracts which can be
traded on an exchange, 19 but are far more commonly traded in privately
negotiated over-the-counter (OTC) transactions. 20 Exchange-traded de-
rivatives consist of standardized contracts that are traded on the floor of a
regulated exchange. The advantages of this type of transaction lie in the
standardization of the instruments, which provides liquidity, and in the
reduction or elimination of credit risk to the holder of the contract. 21 In
the OTC market, the parties to the derivatives contract include the deriv-
atives dealer and the derivatives end-user.22 The OTC market allows
end-users the luxury of obtaining derivative products custom tailored to
their needs; nearly any aspect of the agreement can be negotiated, includ-
"tranches") that repay investors over different time periods or based on different compo-
nents of the mortgage debt. For example, the interest and principal components of mort-
gage-backed securities are often stripped apart, allowing the securities to be divided into
"interest-only" (10) and "principal-only" (PO) classes. The term "collateralized mortgage
obligations" refers to mortgage-backed securities that have been divided in this manner.
GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE AND DE-
VELOPMENT 905-06, 947-50 (4th ed. 1992). Although seemingly straightforward in nature,
these financial instruments are considered to be some of the most complex ever created.
Michael Carrol & Alyssa A. Lappen, Mortgage-Backed Mayhem, INSTITUTIONAL INVES-
TOR, July, 1994, at 81.
17. Freeman, supra note 2, at 9. For a more detailed discussion of the common types
of derivative instruments, see infra part II.C.
18. Freeman, supra note 2, at 9. For further explanation of these types of derivative
instruments, see infra part II.C.
19. Hu, supra note 8, at 1465; see also Freeman, supra note 2, at 9.
20. In terms of notional value, exchange-traded derivative instruments account for
only a small percentage of the derivatives market. While the growth of the exchange-
traded market has been proportional to that of the OTC market, the bulk of the expansion
in the use of derivative instruments has occurred in off-exchange transactions. Lindholm,
supra note 5, at 77.
21. Karol & Lehman, supra note 3, at 122-23. Credit risk is the risk that the
counterparty to a contract will default. In exchange-traded derivative contracts, the ex-
change functions as a clearinghouse; it is the counterparty to every transaction. Credit risk
is reduced because the financial strength of the exchange is easily assessed, and an ex-
change is far less likely to default on a contract than the typical non-exchange
counterparty. Id.
22. "Dealers" are generally banks, securities firms, insurance companies, or their affili-
ates. "End-users" are market participants who enter into derivatives contracts to manage
or profit from financial risks. Thus, end-users, though typically dealers' customers, may
also be derivatives dealers themselves. End-users include a variety of investors ranging
from banks and commercial market players to municipalities, retail investors, and corpo-
rate treasury departments. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. B-257099, FI-
NANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 29 (1994)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT].
Although thousands of institutions worldwide are derivatives end-users, OTC dealing is
concentrated among a small percentage of major financial firms. By the end of 1992, the
top seven U.S. bank OTC dealers accounted for more than 90% of all domestic bank OTC
dealing, and the top five U.S. securities firms dealing in OTC derivatives were responsible
for some 87% of all derivatives activity by domestic securities firms. Id. at 36. With few
exceptions, private individuals are seldom able to participate directly in OTC derivative
transactions. Hu, supra note 8, at 1465 & n.29; see also Lindholm, supra note 5, at 75 n.7.
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ing terms such as timing of payments and interest rates.23 This type of
transaction, however, lacks the protection afforded exchange-based trans-
actions, leaving end-users to bear the credit risk of a counterparty default.
In addition, OTC transactions lack other protective elements associated
with exchange-based contracts. For example, transactions made on the
exchange are subject to daily market-to-market value adjustments (a
means of "fine-tuning" a party's collateral), and counterparties are sub-
ject to posting of margin deposits and limitations on price and positions.2 4
The OTC and exchange-traded derivatives markets are at once com-
petitive and mutually beneficial. While the exchange market is in some
ways restricted by a more rigorous regulatory structure, the liquidity and
creditworthiness it offers has made it a desirable market for OTC dealers.
The relationship is symbiotic: OTC dealers look to standardized exchange
products as hedges for their customized transactions, and the exchange,
in turn, develops standardized products to meet this demand. As a conse-
quence of this interplay, the volume of exchange-traded instruments has
grown in direct proportion to the explosive increase in OTC
transactions.2 5
B. THE FUNCTION OF DERIVATIVE TRANSACTIONS
The unprecedented expansion in the use of derivatives can be seen as
the business world's response to the financial risks posed by increasingly
globalized financial markets. The primary risks are associated with un-
predictable (volatile) movements in foreign exchange and interest rates,
as well as in the prices of equities and commodities.2 6 Derivatives are a
means by which elements of risk can be stripped away from a transaction,
providing the user with cost-effective protection from this market volatil-
ity.27 Derivatives are now used by thousands of entities worldwide, typi-
cally in the pursuit of one or more of three goals: (1) hedging, (2)
reducing funding costs, and (3) speculation.28
The term "hedging" refers to the risk management activities investors
engage in to reduce their exposure to unpredictable changes in the mar-
ket. Used as a risk management tool, derivatives allow end-users to re-
duce inherent market risks, creating a more stable and predictable cash
flow that is insulated from market swings. This goal is attainable because
derivatives provide a means by which end-users can shift the risks
presented by market fluctuations to a player who is willing to bear such
risks.29 The investor protects his position by investing in derivative trans-
actions whose value varies inversely with the value of his assets, so that
losses in the value of owned assets will be offset by gains in the value of
23. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 24.
24. Melamed, supra note 4, at 67.
25. Karol & Lehman, supra note 3, at 123.
26. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 24.
27. Id
28. Id at 25.
29. See Loomis, supra note 6, at 41; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 24.
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derivative contracts. 30 Transactions of this nature may benefit both par-
ties. End-users gain by shifting risk, thereby creating a sort of "insur-
ance" on their assets; dealers may realize a similar hedging benefit by
passing the acquired risk on to yet another dealer or by using the ac-
quired position as a hedge to their own positions.31 In addition, dealers
earn fee income for providing the derivative to the end-user. 32
The derivative is also used as a tool by which end-users reduce funding
costs; 33 in many cases investing in a derivative is considerably less costly
than purchasing the underlying asset itself because of reduced transaction
costs and the leverage the instrument provides. 34 For example, rather
than buying or selling $100,000 worth of an underlying asset on the cash
market, an investor might use a derivatives contract to achieve the same
effect for a fraction of the up-front cash required to effect the underlying
transaction. The investor might be required to post a deposit of only
$1500 (one and one-half percent of the face value of the underlying asset)
but would realize all the same profits or losses as one who actually
purchased $100,000 worth of the underlying asset. 35 As an illustration of
the power of derivative transactions, the GAO Report on Financial De-
rivatives points out that for a mere five to ten percent of the value of the
underlying stocks, a derivatives end-user could realize the same gains or
losses as a hypothetical investor buying all of the stocks listed in the Stan-
dard & Poor's 500 Index.36 An additional benefit realized by derivatives
end-users is an enhancement of creditworthiness. An entity that has re-
duced its exposure to market risks by hedging with derivatives is gener-
ally able to obtain more preferable financing terms.37
Derivative transactions also serve as a means by which market partici-
pants can speculate. 38 Where hedgers seek to protect themselves by
transferring risk, speculators take risks by betting on fluctuations in the
market value of derivatives or underlying assets. Just as derivatives pro-
vide the hedger with an affordable means of protecting his position, a
speculator may likewise utilize derivatives to reap the benefits (or losses)
of a market movement without having to actually buy or sell the underly-
30. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 25.
31. Id at 29.
32. Smith & Lipin, supra note 2, at Al.
33. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 25. Note that end-users can also reduce funding
costs by obtaining better debt-financing arrangements utilizing a derivative instrument
known as a "swap." For a complete discussion of swaps and other derivative instruments,
see infra part II.C.3.
34. Hu, supra note 8, at 1466; see also Anne Beroza & Robert M. McLaughlin, What
General Counsel Need to Know About Derivatives; Understanding Risks Can Protect Your
Company, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 1994, at 14. Derivatives allow investors to make "big
market bets" without the huge front-end cash availability such transactions would other-
wise require. Smith & Lipin, supra note 2, at Al.
35. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 25-26; see also Smith & Lipin, supra note 2, at Al.
36. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 25-26.
37. Id. at 25.
38. The term "speculation" refers to the taking of calculated risks in an attempt to
profit by anticipating (or speculating on) changes in the market. Id.
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ing asset.39 In general, the participation of speculators enhances the mar-
ket by providing an outlet onto which dealers can shift the risks they have
acquired from hedging end-users, thereby adding liquidity to the market
and ensuring that participants can not only take a position but get rid of it
as well. Speculation is seen in a negative light, however, when under-
taken by public or private fund managers seeking to show profits or
above-market rates of return on investment pools. The distinction lies in
the nature of the funds that investors put at risk through the speculative
activity. When dealers speculate, they subject themselves to an accepta-
ble level of risk in return for the chance to profit. When fund managers
undertake such investments, they put at risk the funds needed to pay for
schools and municipal improvements (in the case of a public fund invest-
ment), or those of private investors who were never informed of the type
of risks involved in speculative derivative activities. 40
C. DERIVATIVE BUILDING BLOCKS
A wide and continually evolving array of derivative instruments is
traded on the modem derivatives markets (particularly on the OTC mar-
ket), ranging from relatively simple "plain vanilla" varieties to the so-
called "hybrid" and "exotic" products, whose market value and risk po-
tential can be calculated only with the aid of sophisticated computer
software.41 In spite of the diversity of instruments available, derivatives
contracts are actually constructed from one or more of four basic "build-
ing blocks" or components: options, swaps, forwards, and futures.42 In
general, forwards, futures, and options are tools for both hedging and
speculation activities, while swaps serve either as hedges or as a means by
which more desirable financing can be obtained.43 Sophisticated dealers
trade in these derivative "building blocks," and also combine them to
39. Id.
40. Waxman, supra note 3, at 4. See infra part III.C for a discussion and examples of
the risks speculative derivative activities pose to public and private investment funds.
41. See Hu, supra note 8, at 1467-68. Under the appropriate heading "The Need For
Clairvoyance," Hu explains the complexities involved in evaluating the risks associated
with even the simplest forms of derivative transactions, noting that such computations are
far more complex than similar calculations made on bank loans, yet far simpler than those
for more complex derivatives. Id. OTC dealers in today's market employ elaborate com-
puter systems utilizing mathematical models to simulate market activity, all in the quest to
accurately determine the market value and risk qualities of derivative instruments. Id. at
1476-77 & n.104; see also Saul Hansell, The Risk Collectors, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,
Sept. 1991, at 59. In pointing out the complexity of the derivatives market and the instru-
ments themselves, Hansell observes that the type of person drawn to the risk-management
field must have a quantitative or spatial ability to comprehend and manage multiple risks.
According to Pierre DuPont, head of the equity derivatives section at J. P. Morgan & Co.,
"[t]he derivatives trader has to have hyperspace inside his head .... He has to react to
what's in his book, to what's happening in the market and to what comes from clients." kCL
42. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 26; see also Hu, supra note 8, at 1466-67; Loomis,
supra note 6, at 43.
43. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 26. Swaps are not commonly used to speculate




produce the more complex "hybrid" products.44 An elaboration on the
nature and function of these derivatives components appears below.
1. Forwards and Futures
Forwards and futures are transactions that place obligations on both
parties to the contract. In each instance, one party is bound to buy and
the other to sell a particular underlying asset at a set price and quantity at
an agreed-upon future date.4 5 The main difference between a forward
contract and a futures contract is that the former is an OTC-traded deriv-
ative, the terms of which are highly negotiable, while the latter is a more
standardized agreement that is traded on an organized exchange.4 6 Par-
ties to a forward or futures contract pay no premium or fee for the oppor-
tunity to enter the contract, and no money is exchanged until the due
date arrives and the contract expires.47 In a futures contract, however,
since the exchange serves as guarantor of payment, both sides are re-
quired to put up collateral to back their obligations.48
Either a forward or a futures contract can be used to hedge a posi-
tion;49 the appropriate instrument is the one that best matches the end-
user's needs. For example, imagine a hypothetical U.S. company which
plans to build a factory in Germany, at an estimated cost of $100 million.
The company knows it will need the $100 million, converted into German
marks, in six months' time. By entering into a foreign exchange forward
contract, the company can lock in the current dollar-to-mark exchange
rate. In this way the company is able to hedge the risk that the dollar will
buy less marks in the future when the payment comes due.50 In this case,
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. The first derivative products consisted of standard contracts offered by organ-
ized markets such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Chicago Board of Trade.
In exchange for a fee, banks and other off-exchange entities began to create more custom-
ized instruments, which led to the development and rise of the OTC market. Freeman,
supra note 2, at 9.
47. Smith & Lipin, supra note 2, at Al. Note that when the time arrives for the parties
to settle on the contract, cash is often exchanged rather than the actual underlying asset.
Id.
48. Id. As previously noted, collateral requirements are a safety component associ-
ated with exchange-traded derivative contracts, and are generally not part of an OTC
transaction. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of exchange-
traded versus OTC transactions.
49. Note that both forwards and futures can also be used by speculators. A speculator
who predicts a rapid rise in the value of a foreign currency could enter a forward or futures
contract, the value of which rises in proportion to the value of that currency. The specula-
tor will suffer a loss if the foreign currency fails to rise in value or rises too slowly in value.
If the value of the currency rises at a more rapid rate than the market had expected, the
speculator will profit. See GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 27.
50. See Loomis, supra note 6, at 43; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 33.
Although the company has averted the risk of a reduction in the value of the U.S. dollar,
the forward contract will impose an opportunity cost if it is the price of the German cur-
rency, rather than the dollar, which falls. In that case, the forward contract obliges the
company to pay a higher than market price for the foreign currency. See Loomis, supra
note 6, at 43.
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a forward rather than a future contract was utilized because of the cus-
tomized nature of the end-user's needs.
2. Options
An option is a derivatives contract giving an end-user the right, but not
an obligation, to buy or sell a given asset at a certain price during a set
period of time.51 Like forwards and futures, options are available in stan-
dardized form, sold through an organized exchange, or as custom-tailored
instruments sold on the OTC market.5 2 The end-user pays a fee or "pre-
mium," usually some percentage of the face value of the underlying as-
set, to secure the option.53 Unless the market value of the underlying
asset exceeds the price fixed by a call option (or is less than the price
fixed by a put option), the end-user has no incentive to exercise the
option.54
The same hypothetical used to illustrate the use of a forward contract
will also serve to show how an option contract works. In the hypotheti-
cal, a U.S. company planned to build a factory in Germany, knowing that
in six months the equivalent of U.S. $100 million in German marks would
be required for costs. For the price of a call option premium (typically a
small percentage of the underlying asset), the company could secure the
right to buy the marks at a set rate of exchange. By purchasing an option
rather than a forward contact, the end-user has the advantage of being
able to buy the foreign currency at the locked-in rate should the market
price rise above the contract price, while reserving the right to walk away
from the contract should the market price of the currency fall below the
contract price. 55 In the event of a decline in the currency price, the buyer
stands to lose only the premium paid for the option, and will not be
forced to pay a greater-than-market price for the currency as he would
have been obliged to do had he entered into a forward rather than an
option contract.
51. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 27. Options giving the purchaser the right to buy
an underlying asset are known as "call options," and options to sell are called "put
options."
52. Smith & Lipin, supra note 2, at Al; see also Hu, supra note 8, at 1467. Note that
unlike forwards and futures, which place an obligation on both parties to the contract,
options do not bind the purchaser to perform. Id. This means that a purchaser of an
option stands to lose no more than the amount paid for the option, while the dealer's losses
are potentially unlimited. See GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 27.
53. Smith & Lipin, supra note 2, at Al.
54. See GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 27-28. In the language used by market trad-
ers, a call option is "in the money" if the exercise price is less than the current market price
of the underlying asset, "at the money" when the exercise and market prices are the same,
and "out of the money" when the exercise price exceeds the market price. In the case of
put options, the terminology is reversed; the option is "in the money" when the exercise
price exceeds the market price, "at the money" when the prices are equal, and "out of the
money" when the market price exceeds the exercise price. Richard R. Howe, Derivative
Securities, in SEC SEcriON 16 RuLEs 35, 37 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. B4-6971, 1991).
55. See Loomis, supra note 6, at 43; GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 28.
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Options are also an attractive tool for speculation. When used for
speculative purposes, the end-user purchases an option on some underly-
ing asset, such as the foreign currency described in the preceding hypo-
thetical. The option may be set up so that its value will increase as the
value of the underlying asset increases, or, alternatively, so that its value
will increase if the value of the underlying asset falls. Either way, the
speculator will profit only if the value of the underlying asset moves far
enough in the anticipated direction to generate profits in excess of the
amount paid for the option.56 Speculators also profit by accumulating the
premiums on unexercised options they themselves write. Of course, the
speculator who writes an option may suffer losses beyond the value of the
premium received if the value of the underlying asset moves substantially
in a direction unfavorable to his position.57
3. Swaps
Swaps, considered to be the quintessential OTC derivative, 58 are a type
of forward contract in which two parties agree to exchange a series of
payments according to agreed-upon terms over a set period of time.59
The amount of the payments involved is determined with reference to an
agreed-upon notional amount which, aside from currency swap transac-
tions, is seldom actually exchanged. 60 Because the terms of a swap must
be carefully tailored to benefit the parties' needs, this type of derivative
instrument is a privately negotiated, OTC transaction. These periodic
payments may be fixed 61 or floating, 62 and the exchange is made because
each party seeks the form of payment held by the other party. 63
To illustrate how a swap works, imagine two mortgagors holding mort-
gages with a current interest rate of ten percent. Mortgagor A's mort-
gage has a floating interest rate, and A is sure that interest rates will rise.
Mortgagor B holds a fixed rate mortgage, and he is equally convinced
that interest rates will go down. In this case each mortgagor believes his
position would be enhanced if only his mortgage carried the form of in-
terest rate (a type of periodic payment) held by the other. A common
56. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 28. Speculation is particularly risky because no
benefit will be realized if either (i) the market value of the underlying asset does not move
enough to create profits in excess of the premium price, or (ii) moves in an unfavorable
direction. In any case, by using an option rather than a forward or futures contract, the
speculator stands to lose no more than price of the premium and any associated transaction
costs. Id.
57. Id. at 28.
58. Lindholm, supra note 5, at 79.
59. See Loomis, supra note 6, at 43; GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 28; Hu, supra
note 8, at 1467; Lindholm, supra note 5, at 79; Cunningham et al., supra note 1, at 4; Fink,
supra note 8, at 93.
60. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 28.
61. "Fixed" payments, as the term implies, are payments of a set amount, and do not
vary with reference to any market value or rate.
62. "Floating" payments are variable in amount, changing with reference to market
interest or currency rates or the market values of commodities or equities.
63. See Loomis, supra note 6, at 43.
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swap agreement, known as an "interest rate swap," 64 would allow each
mortgagor to get his wish by, in effect, contractually agreeing to take the
other's interest position. At the end of a period of time specified in the
contract, the mortgagors would "settle up" between themselves based on
the actual movement of interest rates.65 These payments would normally
be calculated and made on the same day, allowing the parties simply to
net their payments; the party who, at the end of the given period, holds
the higher of the two interest obligations simply pays the other the net
difference. 66 If, in the hypothetical above, interest rates increased during
the period, mortgagor B would owe mortgagor A an amount equal to the
net difference in the amount due under each rate. Had interest rates de-
creased during the given period, the same obligations would exist, except
that it would then be mortgagor A who owed mortgagor B the net
amount. 67
Swaps are commonly used as hedging devices by corporations, banks, 68
and other financial institutions. As an illustration of how swaps can pro-
vide such protection, examine the case of a hypothetical bank. The na-
ture of the bank's business makes it an interest rate sensitive entity. The
bank has an extensive portfolio of floating rate loans, but is also obliged
to pay interest on deposits to attract customers and capital.69 While the
floating rate on the loan is adjusted often, the rate of interest paid on
64. This type of simple swap arrangement (the exchange of a floating interest rate for
a fixed interest rate), and similar straightforward, easily valued transactions are known in
the industry as "plain vanilla." See Hu, supra note 8, at 1467. In contrast are the so-called
"exotic" derivative instruments, which are custom-made for a specific customer for the
purpose of managing a specific financial risk. Dean Tomasula, Derivatives: Defining Exotic
Transactions, AM. BANKER, Oct. 7, 1994, at 15. Tomasula likens the difference between
"plain vanilla" and "exotic" transactions to that between custom-tailored and off-the-rack
suits. Id. Note that interest rate swaps are but one of many types of swaps commonly
made in the OTC market. Similar transactions are used to hedge against market fluctua-
tions in currency exchange rates, stock prices, commodity prices, as well as other market
indices. Hu, supra note 8, at 1467.
65. Loomis, supra note 6, at 43.
66. Lindholm, supra note 5, at 79.
67. This example illustrates the basic concept of derivative transactions. Note that
even after the mortgagors entered into the swap contract, each still held, and was bound by
the terms of, his original mortgage agreement. The swap arrangement, however, effec-
tively converted the interest component of mortgagor A's debt from a floating to a fixed
rate, and mortgagor B's interest component from a fixed to a floating rate.
68. In addition to their value as a hedging instrument, swaps can also earn income for
banks. End-users of swaps are often hesitant to deal directly with one another (usually
because each party feels it cannot adequately assess the other party's creditworthiness),
creating an opportunity for banks and other financial institutions to act as intermediaries.
As intermediary, a bank enters into a swap arrangement with both parties and accepts the
risks associated with both transactions. Bearing this risk allows the intermediary to com-
mand a higher fixed or floating rate on one swap than it pays on another, the spread be-
tween the rates amounting to income. See Lindholm, supra note 5, at 79-80.
69. In a "floating rate" loan, the rate of interest paid by the borrower is variable and is
typically tied to the market interest rate. When the market rate goes up, so too does the
loan interest rate. Banks use the spread between the fixed rates paid on deposits and the
floating rates on outstanding loans as a source of revenue.
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deposits is adjusted less frequently-say biannually.70 Because of the
time lag in the frequency with which these rates are adjusted, a downturn
in market interest rates would expose the bank to potential losses; inter-
est collected on outstanding loans would be adjusted downward to reflect
the market fluctuation, but the rate the bank pays on its deposits would
not be reduced for some time.
The bank's potential for loss, which in this case would be from what is
known as "interest rate risk," could be hedged with a swap contract.
Under the terms of such an arrangement, the bank would make payments
based on some floating interest rate, and in return would receive pay-
ments based on a fixed interest rate from a counterparty, each rate being
determined with respect to some agreed-upon (though usually hypotheti-
cal) notional amount. Because of the swap, the bank's position is pro-
tected whether interest rates rise or fall; if rates go up, the bank's
earnings from its floating rate loans increase, offsetting the higher
amounts it would then pay on the floating rate obligations acquired in the
swap. If, on the other hand, interest rates decline, the bank's fixed-rate
payouts will be offset by the fixeo-rate stream of income it receives under
the swap agreement.71 Market participants also frequently use swaps to
secure more favorable financing terms. In this situation a borrower with
low-rated credit can reduce its financing costs by borrowing at a floating
rate,72 which it can obtain relatively cheaply, then swapping the rate for
the fixed rate of some counterparty. A transaction of this nature allows
parties to, in essence, trade the advantage each enjoys in a given mar-
ket.73 To illustrate, assume a bank with a less than superior credit rating
has extensive short-term floating rate liabilities but, because of its insuffi-
cient credit rating, is unable to obtain more preferable long-term fixed-
rate financing. In contrast, a second bank, one with a superior credit rat-
ing, has access to relatively low-cost, fixed-rate financing but makes its
profits by writing significant numbers of floating rate loans, and conse-
quently requires a large volume of floating rate funds. The smaller bank,
therefore, has an advantage in the floating rate market, while the larger
bank enjoys an advantage in the fixed-rate market. In short, each party
70. An interest rate paid on deposits that is adjusted only annually or biannually is
considered a "fixed" rate. The mismatch between the adjustment periods of fixed and
floating rates were a prime factor in the failure of many domestic savings and loan institu-
tions during the mid-1980s.
71. See GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 28-29. The downside of this arrangement, and
of hedge transactions in general, is that when an entity transfers risk, the opportunity for
gain is transferred as well. A firm that hedges all its risks is protected from losses but is
equally prevented from realizing a gain. The key for a bank or other player in the deriva-
tives market is to achieve a balance between hedged positions and acceptable risks. See
Freeman, supra note 2, at 10.
72. A company with a low or medium credit rating may want to hedge against rising
interest rates by borrowing at a fixed rate; however, companies with other than superior
credit ratings must pay a higher premium for fixed-rate borrowing, making it economically
unfeasible for them to borrow on such terms. See Cunningham et al., supra note 1, at 7;
GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 29.
73. Cunningham et al., supra note 1, at 7.
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holds something the other desires but cannot access directly. A swap al-
lows the more creditworthy bank to exchange a portion of its advantage
in the fixed-rate market for a preferred floating rate, while the smaller
bank trades some of its advantage in the floating rate market for a pre-
ferred fixed rate. 74
D. COMMON OVER-THE-COUNTER (OTC) DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS
The four basic "building blocks" described above-forwards, futures,
options, and swaps-are used on the OTC market to create an almost
infinite variety of derivative instruments.75 An exhaustive description of
these diverse instruments would be impossible to produce; however, cer-
tain "core" derivative instruments, those which are most regularly uti-
lized on the OTC market, can be readily summarized. The following is a
list of these more common derivative instruments. 76
" Interest Rate Swap. In this transaction, one party makes periodic pay-
ments of a specified currency at a fixed interest rate, and the other
party makes periodic payments (of the same currency) at a floating rate
which is subject to regular adjustment.77 The interest rate calculations
are made with respect to some agreed-upon amount (the "notional"
amount) of the given currency.
" Basis Swap. One party makes periodic payments of an agreed-upon
currency at a given floating rate, and the other party makes regular
payments in the same currency at a different floating rate. As with the
interest rate swap, all payment calculations are made with respect to an
agreed-upon notional amount of the given currency.
" Commodity Swap. In this arrangement one party makes periodic pay-
ments of a given currency at a fixed price, and the other party makes
periodic payments of the same currency based on the market price of
some commodity.78 An agreed-upon notional value of the given com-
modity is used to make payment calculations.
" Currency Swap. One party periodically pays a fixed amount of a given
currency, and the other party makes regular payments of a fixed
74. Id
75. See Ida Picker, The Daffier Side of Derivatives, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1,
1993, at 94. In Picker's estimation, derivatives are getting "positively wacky," with the
market now offering such instruments as pollution-rights swaps and catastrophe futures.
Many of these unusual instruments are, according to Picker, likely to "go the way of the
Wankel engine, the Betamax videocassette recorder, and the electric ear muff." Id. at 95;
see also Freeman, supra note 2, at 9 (noting how, in response to market demands for cus-
tom-tailored instruments, a "plethora" of new instruments developed which initiated the
subsequent explosive growth of the OTC market).
76. The information in this list appears in Cunningham et al., supra note 1, at 4-5.
77. The most commonly used floating rate is the London Interbank Offered Rate (LI-
BOR), which is the rate at which the most creditworthy banks loan money to one another.
See Lindholm, supra note 5, at 79 & n.29.
78. 1'Typical commodities would be commonly traded goods such as oil, natural gas, or
precious metals. Commodity swaps whose notional commodity is out of the ordinary fall
into the category of "exotic" derivatives. See generally Picker, supra note 75 (a general
discussion of the development of exotic OTC derivatives).
1996]
SMU LAW REVIEW
amount of a different currency, again calculated with respect to a prede-
termined notional amount. Unlike most other swap arrangements, the
notional amount is actually exchanged upon termination of the cur-
rency swap contract.79 A common variation of the currency swap is the
cross currency rate swap. In that transaction, one party makes periodic
payments of a given currency at a predetermined fixed or floating rate,
and the other party makes regular payments in a different currency
based on a floating rate. In this arrangement, payment calculations are
made with respect to agreed-upon notional amounts of both currencies,
and, like the regular currency swap, the notional amounts are typically
exchanged when the contract expires.
" Equity/Equity Index Swap. One party periodically pays an amount of
a given currency based on a fixed rate or price, in exchange for periodic
payment of the same (or, if so specified, a different) currency in an
amount determined with respect to the performance of a given type of
stock.80
" Forward Rate RTansaction. In this arrangement, one party pays a fixed
rate for a specified time period in exchange for payments from the
other party at a rate to be determined at some given time in the future.
As with most derivative transactions, an agreed-upon notional amount
is used to calculate payments; however, in the forward rate transaction,
payments made at the forward-determined rate are adjusted with re-
spect to other factors, such as the gap between the agreed-upon for-
ward rate and the market rate at the time of payment.
" Interest Rate Option. Under this arrangement, one party receives a
premium for granting the other party the right, but not the obligation,
to receive a payment determined by the amount by which the market
interest exceeds (a "call" option) or is less than (a "put" option) some
interest rate agreed upon by the parties.
" Commodity Option. In a commodity option transaction, one party re-
ceives a premium in exchange for granting the right, but not the obliga-
tion, to buy (a call option) or sell (a put option) a given quantity of a
commodity at an agreed-upon price.81 If the option is exercised, the
granting party may actually deliver the commodity in exchange for the
option price, or simply pay the option holder the difference between
the market and option price.
79. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 28 n.7. In the usual swap contract, the value of
the underlying asset on which the contract is based is truly a notional amount, that is, the
value is used solely to determine the amount of payments to be exchanged and is never
itself actually exchanged. Id.
80. The payment amount may be tied to the performance of a single type of stock, or a
combination of several stocks. The amount may also be determined by reference to an
equity index, such as the Dow Jones Industrial Index or the Standard & Poor's 500 Index.
Cunningham et al., supra note 1, at 5.
81. The price at which an option can be exercised is referred to as the "strike price."
Thomas L. Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?-Derivative Securities
and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86 Nw. U. L.
REv. 987, 989 (1992).
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" Currency Option. Here one party is given a premium for granting an-
other party the right, but not the obligation, to buy (a call option) or
sell (a put option) a given amount of a given currency at an agreed-
upon price.
" Equity Option. In this transaction, one party receives a premium for
granting another party the right, but not the obligation, to buy (a call
option) or sell (a put option) shares of a specified type of stock (or a
combination of types of stock, known as a "basket") at a specified price
at a specified future date. In exchange for this right, the granting party
is paid a premium. Settlement may be made by delivery of the stock in
return for the strike price, or the grantor of the option may pay the
holder the difference between the strike and market price. A related
instrument, the equity index option, gives the holder the right, but not
the obligation, to receive an amount of cash equal to the difference
between a specified equity index and a specified strike price. A call
equity index option pays the amount by which the index exceeds the
strike price, while a put equity index option pays the amount by which
the strike price exceeds the index.
" Bond Option. In exchange for a premium, the grantor of a bond op-
tion gives the other party the right, but not the obligation, to buy (a call
option) or sell (a put option) a specified issuer bond at a specified price
at some agreed-upon future date. Like most other options, the con-
tract may be settled either by delivery of the bond in exchange for the
strike price, or by a payment to the option holder of the difference
between the market and strike price at the date the option is exercised.
" Swap Option.82 Also known as a "swaption," this transaction gives one
party, in exchange for a premium, the right, but not the obligation, to
enter into a swap contract on preset terms within a limited period of
time. Like the currency swap, the swap option may actually be settled
by a transfer of the notional amount of the underlying asset.
" Cap Transaction. In this transaction, one party pays a fixed amount of
a specified currency (either periodically or in a single transfer, depend-
ing on the contract) in exchange for periodic payments of the same
currency by a second party. The second party's payments are based on
the excess, if any, of an agreed-upon floating rate (interest rate cap) or
commodity price (commodity cap) over a specified interest rate (in the
case of an interest rate cap) or commodity price (in the case of a com-
modity cap).
" Floor Transaction. This transaction is essentially the opposite of the
cap transaction. Here, one party pays an amount of a given currency
(either periodically or in a single payment) and receives periodic pay-
ments of the same currency based on the excess, if any, of an agreed-
82. The swap option is one of a number of instruments created by combining two (or
more) of the derivatives "building blocks." These combined instruments are known as
"hybrid" derivatives. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 26.
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upon floating interest rate (an interest rate floor) or commodity price
(commodity floor).
Collar Transaction. This arrangement is a combination of the cap and
floor transactions. One party makes payments based on the floating
rate or commodity price in excess, if any, of a specified rate or price
(cap), and the other party makes payments on the excess, if any, of a
specified interest rate or commodity price over a floating rate or com-
modity price.
E. HYBRID DERIVATIVE TRANSACTIONS
In addition to the traditional derivatives building blocks, the OTC mar-
ket also trades in a variety of instruments that are hybridized versions of
the more straightforward transactions described above. These instru-
ments, known generically as "hybrids" or "exotics," are produced to meet
the risk management needs of a specific client, and, as such, will normally
have limited appeal to the general market. 83 The term is applied to an
instrument not because of its complexity, but rather because the transac-
tion is not in keeping with one or more of the parameters used in stan-
dard derivatives contracts.84 Use of the term "hybrid" has created some
degree of confusion in that it has often been applied improperly to "plain
vanilla" instruments which, on their face, appear quite complex, and be-
cause banks and other dealers often give new names to what are essen-
tially the same products.8 5 The persistent re-naming of the same products
has created an inflated perception regarding the diversity of hybrid in-
struments and the portion of the overall OTC market for which they ac-
count. There is, in fact, a great variety of hybrid derivative instruments in
use, but it is estimated that such instruments make up only about two
percent of the total market.8 6
In light of the relatively. small portion of the market that hybrid deriva-
tives make up, these instruments have been the subject of a seemingly
disproportionate share of industry attention over the past several years.
Two reasons account for this interest: first, the bulk of the recent dra-
matic, derivatives-related losses reported in the financial (and main-
stream) press have involved hybrid instruments;8 7 and second, the use of
hybrid instruments has proven to be extremely profitable, producing high
83. Tomasula, supra note 64, at 15. The term "exotic" is often incorrectly applied to
derivative instruments that are in no way out of the ordinary. According to Frederick
Chapey, senior vice-president of global derivatives at Chase Manhattan Corp., the term
should not be used in reference to an instrument just because it is new, untested, or not
fully understood. Chapey feels the term "exotic" has a negative connotation and prefers
the term "non-traditional." Id.
84. Id
85. Id. In some instances a single financial instrument may be known by as many as a
dozen different names. For example, a product properly known as a "covered option se-
curity" ("cops") has also been called a "rate differential swap," "differential swap," "yield
differential swap," "cross-index swap," and an "interest rate index swap." Id.




yields for banks and other investors.88 In that sense, hybrid instruments
differ from the "plain vanilla" transactions, which are primarily used to
hedge market risks, and which tend to produce relatively small profits for
dealers. Exotic derivatives are big moneymakers.8 9 In a typical "plain
vanilla" swap, involving an underlying asset value of $100 million, a
dealer might earn around $100,000 over a five-year period, while an ex-
otic swap on the same terms could earn the dealer ten times that
amount. 90
In an article on exotics written for The American Banker, Dean
Tomasula created an "annotated dictionary" of exotic derivatives which
helps explain the composition and function, as well as the nomenclature,
of some of the more common exotics in use today.91 Highlights from that
"dictionary" follow:
" Accreting Principal Swap. In this swap transaction, the notional (un-
derlying) principal amount increases over time. Compare this to the
traditional, "plain vanilla" swap, in which the notional value is fixed at
the outset of the transaction. This instrument may also be referred to
as a "dragdown swap," "accumulation swap," staged drawdown swap,"
or "step up'swap." The accreting principal swap is especially well-
suited to banks or other lenders with increasing capital requirements.
" Basket Option. Similar to a "plain vanilla" option, this instrument
gives the dealer a premium in exchange for granting the purchaser the
right, but not the obligation, to buy (call option) or sell (put option) a
given amount of a group (or "basket") of currencies at an agreed-upon
price. Used to hedge multi-currency exposures, these options may be
cheaper than their "plain vanilla" counterparts, which option the
purchase of a single type of currency. In addition, the basket option
may also be cheaper because the contract expirations vary, making
some "in-the-money" and some "out-of-the-money." 92
" Blended Interest Rate Swap. This derivative combines two or more
standard interest rate swaps, in which payment calculations are made
based on a weighted average of the rates involved. The payments on
these instruments are often less than those required by an individual
interest rate swap.
" Boost Structure. This term is used to describe any number of standard
derivative instruments (swaps, options, etc.) whose payoff is increased
("boosted") by a limit placed on the allowable price range of the un-
derlying asset. If the value of the underlying asset moves outside the
agreed-upon range, the note becomes worthless.
88. Tomasula, supra note 64, at 15.
89. Smith & Lipin, supra note 2, at Al.
90. Id. According to Paul Spraos, publisher of the Swaps Monitor newsletter, some
U.S. dealers made more than half of their revenues through the use of exotics-an impres-
sive figure considering the small market share exotics command. Id.; see also Tomasula,
supra note 64, at 15.
91. Tomasula, supra note 64, at 15.
92. For an explanation of these terms, see supra note 54.
1996]
SMU LAW REVIEW
* Covered Option Security. These instruments are short-term notes with
a high coupon and an embedded put, giving the issuer the right to pay
interest and principal in a given foreign currency, at an exchange rate
fixed at the time the note is issued. These derivatives present the ad-
vantage of a payout rate which is known at the time the transaction
occurs.
" Differential Swap. These instruments allow the purchaser to pay a
floating interest rate on one currency while receiving a floating interest
rate on another, different currency. The purchaser uses the differential
swap to take advantage of interest rate differentials in various currency
markets without exposure to changes in currency rates.
" Digital Swap. This swap allows the purchaser to pay a set, fixed inter-
est rate, but if floating rates rise above a predetermined level, the bor-
rower's payments will increase to a level above the fixed rate.
* Dynamite Warrant. A warrant that pays off only if the rate at which
two currencies are exchanged remains within a predetermined range
throughout the life of the warrant.
* Exploding Option. This instrument is a collar-type structure in which
the short option expires and the long option pays off when the underly-
ing structure trades through an outstrike price.
* FX Range Floating Rate Note. This derivative has a payout (usually
with a one-year maturity) which is tied to the length of time the value
of the underlying asset remains within a predetermined range. The
note pays for each day the underlying asset value remains within the
agreed upon range, but pays nothing for each day the value of the un-
derlying asset moves outside the range.
" 10 Inverse. This instrument is a collateralized mortgage obligation 93
(interest only strip) whose coupons lose value as interest rates rise.
* Index Amortizing Swap. This instrument is an interest rate swap
whose notional amount declines at short-term money rates (such as LI-
BOR94) or the yield on constant maturity Treasury bills. These widely
used exotics serve as an alternative to mortgage-backed securities and
are often used by banks as a hedge for the risks associated with savings
deposit interest.
* Kitchen Sink Bonds. Also known as "by-product bonds," these instru-
ments are created by packaging many different underlying pools of
mortgages with a variety of different expected cash flows-essentially
the leftovers of other mortgage transactions.
93. For a discussion of mortgage-backed securities and collateralized mortgage obliga-
tions, see supra note 16.




III. DERIVATIVES AND THE MODERN FINANCIAL MARKET
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DERIVATIVES MARKET
While the concept of hedging risk has been around for some time,95 the
development and expansion of the modern derivatives market has come
about, at least in part, in response to fundamental changes in global fi-
nancial markets that have taken place over the past few decades.9 6 In-
creases in the volatility of foreign and domestic interest rates, currency
exchange rates, and commodity and equity prices97 produced a corre-
sponding demand in the financial community for a cost-effective means of
managing risk. 98 It was precisely this demand that led to the striking
levels of growth witnessed in the use and evolution of financial deriva-
tives. 99 At the root of this increasing market volatility was the global shift
to the floating exchange rate system, under which the value of world cur-
95. See Froot et al., supra note 3, at 92. Froot relates the story of an extremely early
implementation of risk management theory-directly from the Old Testament. The Egyp-
tian Pharaoh was concerned over a dream he had in which seven healthy cows were con-
sumed by seven sickly cows, and seven healthy ears of corn were consumed by seven sickly
ears. The Pharaoh called upon Joseph to interpret the dream. Joseph explained that the
dream indicated seven years of plenty, to be followed by seven years of famine. The finan-
cially astute Pharaoh, wanting to hedge the risk of famine, proceeded to buy and store
huge quantities of corn, allowing Egypt to prosper during the years of famine. Id.
96. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 24; see also Freeman, supra note 2, at 9. While
the concept of using the basic derivatives building blocks is not a new one, the implementa-
tion of today's complex instruments as financial risk management tools is theorized to have
developed only recently because, in addition to the lack of technical and theoretical inno-
vations, such tools were simply not needed. Sykes Wilford, a director in the risk manage-
ment group at Chase-Manhattan, likens the situation to that of man-made rubber. The
product had been synthesized in the laboratory long before shortages of natural rubber
supplies, caused by World War II, made its use an economically viable alternative. Like-
wise, only after financial risks became "endemic," and financial institutions realized their
customers would pay to reduce volatility risks, did a full-fledged market for these products
develop. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 24.
97. To illustrate this volatility, consider the following examples. During the first half
of 1986, world oil prices dropped by 50%, while energy prices overall fell 24%. Companies
like Dresser Industries, a supplier of machinery and equipment to the energy industry,
could have employed derivatives as a means of insulating themselves from these fluctua-
tions. Because Dresser lacked such risk management protection, the company saw its prof-
its decline from $292 million in 1985 to $139 million in 1986, while the price of its stock fell
from $24 to $14 a share. Caterpillar, a U.S. producer of earth-moving equipment, suffered
similarly because of fluctuations in the value of U.S. currency. The dollar, which had ap-
preciated by 50% during the first half of the 1980s, dropped back to its starting point by
1988. To remain competitive in the global market, Caterpillar reacted to the strong dollar
by cutting prices on its exports, reducing the companies short-term profits and long-term
competitiveness. The result was a real-dollar sales decline of 45% between 1981 and 1985,
during which time Caterpillar lost market share to its foreign competitors. As was the case
with Dresser, Caterpillar could have avoided this fate by insulating itself from exchange
rate risks with derivatives. Froot et al., supra note 3, at 91.
98. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 24.
99. Nowhere has the development of new financial tools been more rapid or sophisti-
cated than in the over-the-counter derivatives market. Hu, supra note 8, at 1459. Because,
in many instances, these customized products are so complex, the Wall Street wizards who
create and introduce the new instruments have come to be known as "rocket scientists."
Loomis, supra note 6, at 41.
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rencies vary in response to the market forces of supply and demand.'00
In addition to this new demand for risk-hedging instruments, the explo-
sion of the derivatives market was catalyzed by important technological
advances, such as the widespread use and availability of sophisticated
desktop computers, 101 and theoretical innovations which allowed for a
more accurate assessment of the value of derivative instruments.102
The theoretical breakthrough that paved the way for the development
of the broad derivatives market came in 1973, when Fischer Black and
Myron Scholes introduced their option pricing model. 0 3 The essence of
the theory lies in the realization that the price of an option is dependent
on the volatility of the market; the greater the level of market price fluc-
tuations, the more likely it becomes that a given option will be exercised,
and the greater the price the option should command. 0 4 The Black-
Scholes theory provided the financial world with a means of assessing the
variables which affect an option's theoretical value, which in turn allowed
options to be priced in a relatively uniform manner. 0 5 Relatively simple
derivative instruments, such as stock options, were traded as non-stan-
dard OTC instruments prior to the development of the Black-Scholes
model, but the pricing of such instruments lacked any legitimate theoreti-
cal basis.' 06 The publication of the Black-Scholes formula, which was al-
most immediately embraced by the financial community, coincided with
another important event-an experiment in exchange-based options trad-
ing undertaken by the Chicago Board Options Exchange. 07 This experi-
ment was the creation of the Chicago Board of Trade, which was created
to list and trade standardized option contracts utilizing the same ex-
change-based trading principles which the exchange had successfully em-
ployed in the trading of futures. 08
100. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 24 & n.1. Prior to 1973, global exchange rates
were stabilized under the Bretton Woods system, which fixed the value of foreign curren-
cies to the U.S. dollar. This was possible because the dollar was, at that time, convertible
into gold (at the rate of $35 per ounce). In 1971, the U.S. moved away from the gold-
backed dollar, and within two years' time, the global market had shifted to a floating ex-
change rate system. Market volatility was increased by numerous other factors, including a
shift in U.S. monetary policy away from attempting to control interest rates to prevent
inflation, as well as the general globalization of markets. Id.; see also Hu, supra note 8, at
1466.
101. Karol & Lehman, supra note 3, at 122.
102. Froot et al., supra note 3, at 91. Froot points out that, although these innovative
valuation techniques resulted in an "arsenal of risk-management weapons," the techniques
did not provide guidance on how the "weapons" should be used. Id.
103. Hu, supra note 8, at 1469. The model provided a rational, though not necessarily
accurate, means of pricing option contracts. Id.
104. Hansell, supra note 41, at 58.
105. Hu, supra note 8, at 1475. For a detailed discussion of the Black-Scholes option
pricing formula, see Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate
Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973).
106. Karol & Lehman, supra note 3, at 123.
107. Hu, supra note 8, at 1474.
108. Karol & Lehman, supra note 3, at 123. These techniques included the trading of
options in an auction conducted on the floor of the exchange, with the exchange acting as
counterparty to every transaction (the clearinghouse function). In an option contract, the
holder has no financial obligation beyond payment of an initial premium. In a futures
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The earliest trading of modem derivative instruments in a standardized
(and thus liquid) form, then, were those contracts traded on organized
exchanges such as the Chicago Board of Trade and Chicago Board Op-
tions Exchange. 0 9  Such exchange-traded standardized contracts
predominated during the infancy of the modem market, but as end-users
demanded more customized instruments, ones which would more exact-
ingly meet their risk management needs, the exchange-based market was
supplanted by the emerging over-the-counter (OTC) market. 110 Today,
the volume of OTC traded derivatives dwarfs that of their exchange-
traded counterparts. OTC derivatives are generally preferred over ex-
change-traded instruments because of their longer maturity periods and
the flexibility they offer with respect to contractual terms."'
Since its inception, the modem derivatives market has experienced
steady, and more recently, phenomenal growth. According to one recent
study, between the years 1989 and 1992, the use of derivatives grew by
145%.112 By the end of 1991, the estimated notional value of the ex-
change-traded derivatives market had grown to approximately $4 trillion,
representing an eight-fold increase over its level just five years earlier.113
In that same year, the notional value of the OTC market was put at ap-
proximately $8 trillion."14 Although complete information is not avail-
able, the estimated global notional volume of outstanding derivatives at
the end of fiscal year 1992 was over $12 trillion."15 Currently, the no-
tional value of the entire derivatives market (including both exchange-
traded and OTC-traded instruments) is an estimated $16 trillion, of which
OTC derivatives account for an estimated $10 trillion." 6 The notional
contract, however, the exchange requires participants to put a deposit (some percentage of
the face value of the contract) into an escrow account. As the value of the contract fluctu-
ates in response to the market value of the underlying asset, the participant either pays or
receives the amount of money necessary to maintain the original level of the deposit. If a
participant fails to maintain this margin, known as a "cushion," the exchange cancels the
contract. Id.
109. Lindholm, supra note 5, at 77; see also Freeman, supra note 2, at 9.
110. Freeman, supra note 2, at 9.
111. Lindholm, supra note 5, at 77.
112. Froot et al., supra note 3, at 91. Corporations accounted for a large share of this
growth, with an estimated fourfold increase in their use of some types of derivative instru-
ments between 1987 and 1991. Id.
113. Hu, supra note 8, at 1459.
114. Lindholm, supra note 5, at 77. Lindholm estimates the notional value of the ex-
change-traded derivatives market for 1991 to be approximately $3 trillion, $1 trillion less
than the estimate cited by Hu. Id.
115. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 34. This estimate excludes more than $5 trillion
worth of foreign exchange forward contracts, but includes more than $2 trillion in forward
rate agreements. Id. at 34 & n.2. Recall that the notional amount, which is the value of the
underlying asset in a derivative contract, is not necessarily indicative of the amount of
money at risk in the transaction. See supra note 5.
116. Loomis, supra note 6, at 43. Note that other sources have put the estimate as low
as around $11 trillion, and others estimate the total notional value of all outstanding deriv-
atives contracts at $35 trillion-an amount which approximates the value of three-quarters
of all the world's stocks, bonds, money-market securities and currencies combined. See
Greenwald, supra note 3, at 55 (citing the lower estimate); Smith & Lipin, supra note 2, at
Al (citing the higher estimate).
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value of swaps alone now exceeds the value of all shares listed on the
New York and Tokyo stock exchanges combined." 7
As these figures indicate, derivatives have, in many ways, become the
centerpiece of the global financial market, serving as both an invaluable
hedging tool and as Wall Street's newest profit source.118 These instru-
ments have come to occupy a position so central to the workings of the
financial world as to merit such superlative descriptions as the "linchpin
of global commerce," 119 "the basic banking business of the 1990s,120
"modern finance in its latest incarnation,"'' and "the bleeding edge of
technology."122  Moreover, the instruments are "quintessentially
global,"' 2 3 linking markets and institutions throughout the world in a
complex web of financial interrelations-a web which many fear could
make an otherwise isolated financial crisis impossible to contain.' 24
B. DERIVATIVES AND RISK
That derivatives serve a wide variety of useful and legitimate purposes,
such as lowering funding costs, providing risk-management benefits, and,
in some instances, providing the opportunity to profit through specula-
tion, cannot be denied. There are, however, serious and unavoidable ele-
ments of risk inherent in the use of these products-risks posing a
potential threat not only to investors, but to the financial system itself.
The fundamental danger inherent in the use of derivatives lies in the fact
that transferring financial risk from one entity to another, however bene-
ficial such a transfer might be, does not eliminate that risk. 125
1. Systemic Risk
The potential hazards that derivatives create for global financial mar-
kets are a function of numerous variables, including the size of the deriva-
tives market, the concentration of derivatives trading among a relatively
small group of major OTC dealers, and the expansion of linkages deriva-
tives have produced between various markets and financial institu-
tions.1 26 In today's financial market, risk simply passes from one entity to
another, and another, and so on, resulting in a global market of intercon-
117. Hu, supra note 8, at 1459.
118. See Hansell, supra note 41, at 58. According to Hansell, nearly every major bank
and brokerage firm lacking a derivatives department has scrambled to establish one. By
1990, major players in the equity derivatives market were earning in excess of $100 million
a year, with returns on equity of as much as 40%. According to one London-based head-
hunter, the demand for skilled risk managers is high, with top traders earning $700,000 a
year or more. Id. at 59.
119. Greenwald, supra note 3, at 55.
120. Loomis, supra note 6, at 40 (quoting an unnamed Citicorp executive, in the context
of describing the magnitude of the derivatives market).
121. Smith & Lipin, supra note 2, at Al.
122. Loomis, supra note 6, at 40.
123. Id.
124. Id at 41; GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 37-39.
125. Loomis, supra note 6, at 41.
126. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 37-40.
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nected participants where the failure of one institution could potentially
lead to a system-wide crisis. 127
According to some financial industry regulators, two "worst derivative
nightmare"'128 scenarios are of particular concern. In the first scenario, a
localized financial disaster is fomented when bankers, using derivatives
without fully understanding their risks, deplete the capital reserves of a
major bank, thereby causing it to fail. 129 The second scenario suggests a
more devastating, potentially system-wide disaster. Here, the intercon-
nections created by the use of derivatives creates a chain of obligations
between financial institutions worldwide, and a seemingly isolated failure
to meet interbank payment obligations produces a domino effect among
market dealers and participants, precipitating a major systemic financial
crisis.130
The fear that activity in the derivatives market could lead to a
destabilization of the U.S. (or even the global) financial system is based
on a series of factors, all of which contribute to the potential for a large
scale crisis. One important element is the sheer size of the derivatives
market. As previously discussed, the multi-trillion dollar notional value
of outstanding derivatives contracts is so large that the derivatives activi-
ties of the ten largest American commercial banks alone amount to more
than double the gross domestic product of the United States, which in
turn is "more money than all the money in the world.' 131 The fact that
obligations for such unimaginable quantities of money exist, with few, if
any, known loss reserves to help diffuse a payment crisis, constitutes a
formidable and legitimate concern. 132
Of even greater concern is the fact that the bulk of derivative dealing
activity is concentrated among a relatively small number of firmS. 133 Ac-
cording to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA),
only 150 firms were derivatives dealers worldwide as of December
1992.134 Furthermore, dealing activities were concentrated among a
small percentage of these institutions. 135 At the end of 1991, as few as
eight U.S. banks were responsible for fifty-six percent of the worldwide
127. Id at 39; Hansell & Muehring, supra note 14, at 51, 52; Hu, supra note 8, at 1461-
62.
128. Hansell & Muehring, supra note 14, at 51, 52.
129. Id.
130. See Lindholm, supra note 5, at 84-85.
131. Thomas G. Donlan, Wolf at the Door? Fear of Derivatives May Be More Threaten-
ing Than Derivatives, BARRON'S, Dec. 5, 1994, at 62 (quoting U.S. Representative James
Leach (R-Iowa)); see also Loomis, supra note 6, at 42.
132. See Melamed, supra note 4, at 67. Because there are no exchange-style clearing-
house safeguards for players in the OTC market, the question of whether parties to a
derivatives contract have adequate reserves in case of loss becomes pertinent. In the OTC
market, the creditworthiness of a counterparty presents a major risk. Id.
133. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 36-37.
134. Id. at 32. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association is a trade group
composed of more than 150 investment, commercial, and merchant banks that participate
in the OTC market. Id. at 32 n.18.
135. Melamed, supra note 4, at 67. The "inner circle" of major derivative end-users
includes Bankers Trust, Citicorp, J. P. Morgan, Chemical Bank, Chase Manhattan, Swiss
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notional amount of interest rate and currency swaps. 136 By the end of
1992, the top seven U.S. banks (with respect to notional amount of out-
standing contracts) accounted for ninety percent of all U.S. bank deriva-
tives activity.137 The potential problem brought on by this concentration
of dealing activities is clear to both regulators and market participants;
the abrupt failure or withdrawal from the market of even one major
dealer could seriously degrade market liquidity, undermining the stability
of numerous markets simultaneously.' 38 This instability could then cause
other major dealers to withdraw from the market, or even to fail them-
selves. According to a study conducted by the Group of Ten, even a tech-
nological malfunction at a major dealer could trigger events that might
threaten the stability of the global financial system.139 Results of a study
conducted by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) suggested
that the concentration of credit exposures in a few large dealers would, in
the event of a major player failure, result in larger losses to market par-
ticipants than would otherwise be sustained in a more dispersed dealer
market.140
In addition to the concerns raised by the size of the derivatives market
and the concentration of market volume among a few major players, the
financial linkage that derivatives create among user institutions and the
markets in which the instruments are traded also contributes to the po-
tential for a major market "meltdown." Market linkage occurs when a
firm uses derivative products in one market to hedge risks created in an-
other market.' 4 ' The potential problem here is that instability in one
market will cause similar disruptions in numerous otherwise unrelated
markets. Institutional linkage is the result of user firms' trade amongst
themselves. 142 Again, the concern is that when the major players in a
global market are linked by extensive interfirm obligations, an otherwise
isolated default could set off a chain reaction of instability, one that
would be particularly difficult to predict and thus seemingly impossible
Bank Corp., Deutsche Bank, Societe Generale, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and Salo-
mon Brothers. Id.
136. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 36 & n.5. These results appeared in a study
presented by the Group of Thirty, an international financial policy think tank whose mem-
bers represent the financial industry and academia. Id.
137. Id. at 36 & n.6. This information was taken from the reports of U.S. bank
regulators.
138. Id. at 39.
139. Id. The Group of Ten is a policy coordination group composed of the central
banks of 11 industrialized countries. Id. at 36 n.7; see also Hu, supra note 8, at 1463 n.24.
140. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 39.
141. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 37. The report cites an actual example to illus-
trate how linkage occurs. A bank sold derivative instruments which required it to pay U.S.
dollars to counterparties if the price of oil products, denominated in yen, rose in Japan.
The bank used foreign currency derivatives to hedge the risk of movements in the dollar/
yen exchange rate, and commodities derivatives to hedge potential movements in the price
of petroleum products. Id. at 37-38.
142. Id. at 38. Respondents to a GAO survey of derivatives dealers showed that, on
average, 37% of these firms' obligations arising from derivatives were owed on contracts
with other dealer firms. Id. at 38.
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for regulators to prevent. 143 Regulators feel that the linkage element
would make a financial crisis difficult to contain; 144 if one of the major
dealers failed to meet its obligations, the chain of affected parties would
extend well beyond the counterparties to the defaulted contracts. 145 The
reactions of other major dealers to such a failure would be likely to result
in a dangerous reduction in market liquidity, adversely affecting
thousands of entities worldwide.146 This type of self-accelerating crisis is
exactly what some members of Congress, still feeling the sting of the sav-
ings and loan debacle and the stock market crash of 1987, fear most.14 7 If
federally insured banks fail, they reason, it will be the U.S. taxpayer who
foots the bill. As a result, no fewer than five separate derivatives reform
bills were presented to committees during the 103rd congressional
session.148
2. Investor Risk
While the chances of a derivatives transaction inducing a systemic fi-
nancial disaster are open to debate, there is little doubt that investors face
the possibility of sustaining enormous losses when the instruments are
used. In the OTC market, both dealers and investors may be end-users of
derivative products. Of the two, it is logical to assume that the dealer
will, in most instances, be the more sophisticated party with respect to the
function and risks associated with derivatives. 149 Since the dealer either
143. Hansell & Muehring, supra note 14, at 57. Industry regulators fear that the market
and institutional interlinkage could produce financial crises on several fronts simultane-
ously. A disruption in one market could cause industry-wide panic, potentially causing a
stock market crash, an interbank payment crisis, and an interest rate leap all at one time.
Part of the threat caused by derivative-induced linkage is that the resulting interconnec-
tions are not apparent; regulators are simply unable to determine where linkages exist. Id.
144. Loomis, supra note 6, at 42. According to Gerald Corrigan, former president of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, federal regulators are equipped to handle almost
any crisis-provided they are able to isolate the failed institution from the rest of the finan-
cial market. The market and institutional linkages derivatives create make walling off a
troubled institution a much more difficult task. Non-banking institutions, such as securities
firms, may also be affected by such linkages, and, in the event of a major dealer failure,
might also need to be covered by federal "safety nets." Id.
145. GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 39.
146. Id. In the event of a major dealer's failure, other dealers would be likely to with-
draw from the market, or, alternatively, attempt to protect their positions with hedges on
other markets, causing large price swings that could result in huge losses for market partici-
pants. A serious disruption in the OTC market would put potentially manageable pressure
on domestic exchanges in their effort to maintain orderly markets. Id.
147. See Smith & Lipin, supra note 2, at Al; Fink, supra note 8, at 92. The 500-point
market decline suffered in the stock market crash of 1987 was exacerbated by high-volume
sales of stock index futures by portfolio insurers who relied entirely on derivatives. Loo-
mis, supra note 6, at 42.
148. Smith & Lipin, supra note 2, at Al. See infra part III.C for a discussion of the
positions taken by members of Congress, the financial industry, and federal regulatory
agencies, respectively, on the issue of derivatives regulation.
149. Waxman, supra note 3, at 3. In some instances, transactions may be so complex
that even the most senior financial managers are unable to adequately assess the potential
benefits and risks associated with using derivatives. Id.
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is or should be aware of the risk, it is the investor who is often left out of
the loop when it comes to understanding derivative transactions.
It is for this reason-the lack of sophistication of the consumer-that
disclosure of derivatives-related risks by dealers is so important. At pres-
ent, there are no mandatory regulatory or industry standards requiring
dealers to evaluate their customers' capacity to understand the risks in-
herent in the use of derivatives in an investment portfolio. 150 As a result,
many customers invest funds with little understanding of what derivatives
are or how they work. Moreover, in the case of the individual putting
private money in a purportedly safe investment, such as a money market
or mutual fund, there may be no knowledge that fund managers are even
using derivatives.
Municipalities and other investors of public funds are also subject to
investor risk when derivatives are employed.' 51 In addition to the risk of
inadequate disclosure, many pension funds and municipalities lack the
sophistication, both in a business and technological sense, needed to in-
vest wisely in derivatives. Local boards are often composed of prominent
citizens who, though well respected in their community, lack the financial
expertise needed to properly manage risk. Nor are pension fund boards
or municipalities likely to have access to the sophisticated computer hard-
ware and software dealers employ to evaluate risk. Compounding these
investment risks is the pressure for fund managers to show an impressive
return on investment. This pressure leads fund managers to move toward
increasingly riskier and less well-understood investments-and the result,
as witnessed recently in Orange County, may be disastrous. 152 In light of
these risks, and the apparent lack of ability on the part of many private
and public fund investors to fend for themselves, many commentators
feel that, as a matter of public policy, the derivatives industry must be
subject to new, consumer-friendly regulation. 53
It should be noted, however, that many industry insiders feel that,
while the previously discussed risks are real, there has yet to be any evi-
dence or "warning tremors" foretelling the type of systemic meltdown
predicted by the critics.154 Industry players and even many regulators
believe the likelihood of a derivative-induced financial crisis has been
blown far out of proportion. 55 Derivatives proponents argue that major
dealer banks could withstand in excess of $1 billion of derivatives-in-
150. Id.
151. Id. Both municipalities and public pension funds have dramatically increased their
use of derivatives during the past five years. According to GAO estimates, as many as
50% of local government entities and 40% of state government entities are involved in the
use of derivatives, as are the majority of large pension plans. Id.
152. Orange County recently declared bankruptcy after losing billions of dollars in an
investment scheme that relied primarily on derivatives. Leah N. Spiro et al., Today, Or-
ange County... The Muni Mess on Wall Street. How Bad?, Bus. WK., Dec. 19, 1994, at 28;
see infra part III.C.2 for a full discussion of the Orange County bankruptcy.
153. Waxman, supra note 3, at 4.
154. Hansell & Muehring, supra note 14, at 51; see also Fink, supra note 8, at 95.
155. See Hansell & Muehring, supra note 14, at 51; Lindholm, supra note 5, at 87-89.
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duced losses before the risk of failure becomes real. 156 Furthermore, de-
rivatives proponents believe past history demonstrates that the financial
system can survive the type of disruptions derivatives have the potential
to cause. 157 There is also a feeling among some industry players that de-
rivatives are too valuable a resource, both in terms of benefits to the do-
mestic economy and with respect to U.S. competitiveness abroad, to be
limited by overzealous regulation. 158
Some objective support for the proponents' positions has been ad-
vanced. Traditional, non-derivative financial products have, historically,
been the cause of far greater losses and market disruptions than deriva-
tives. 159 Nor is there evidence clearly to support the contention that de-
rivatives-related activity presents any greater risk than more traditional
financial activities. 160 A number of financial regulators agree that the
magnitude of the threat derivatives pose to the stability of financial mar-
kets has been greatly exaggerated. In the words of Securities and Ex-
change Commission chairman Richard Breeden, "There is too much
alarmist rhetoric involving these products .... We've seen 2,500 banks
fail because of credit risk. 161 We have a long way to go before the swaps
market is as threatening."' 62 Dealers also point to the fact that no one is
more desirous of avoiding a "meltdown" than the industry itself.163
C. DERIVATIVES AND RED INK
Whether the threat of a national or global financial market meltdown
sparked by activity in the derivatives industry is real or imagined, there is
no question that derivatives had much to do with recent spectacular
losses experienced by major market participants. 64 Since early 1993, a
156. Lindholm, supra note 5, at 88. At the time Lindholm wrote this, no single institu-
tional participant had lost more than half this amount. Id.
157. Id. at 89. When large-scale failures occurred at Drexel Burnham Lambert, Olym-
pia & York, and the Bank of New England, each firm's derivatives portfolio was success-
fully transferred or liquidated. Id.
158. Lindholm, supra note 5, at 89.
159. Hansell & Muehring, supra note 14, at 51.
160. Id. Hansell and Muehring claim that traditional activities such as real estate devel-
opment loans and trading in mortgage-backed bonds are actually riskier ventures than
trading in the derivatives market. The difference between traditional activities and deriva-
tive dealing is that the former is more rigidly regulated. Id.
161. Credit risk is the risk that a counterparty to a contract will default. Beroza &
McLaughlin, supra note 34, at 5.
162. Hansell & Muehring, supra note 14, at 51.
163. Loomis, supra note 6, at 42. Dealers argue that the major institutions are exercis-
ing due diligence in the monitoring of their respective risk exposures. J. P. Morgan & Co.
vice-president Mark Brickell points out the fact that even the most complex derivatives
involve the same risks banks have dealt with for years. Hansell & Muehring, supra note
14, at 53. Major financial institutions have, in fact, been praised by the likes of former New
York Federal Reserve Bank president Gerald Corrigan for their efforts with respect to
improvement of internal risk management. Corrigan notes that many dealers have worked
hard to perfect their risk management systems, investing in technological improvements
and even lobbying for laws which will improve the safety of their financial products. Loo-
mis, supra note 6, at 42.
164. See Smith & Lipin, supra note 2, at Al; Greenwald, supra note 3, at 54.
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diverse range of derivatives market participants, ranging from major cor-
porations, municipalities, colleges, investors in ostensibly conservative
money market funds, and even the sophisticated Wall Street dealers
themselves have suffered cumulative losses of at least $6 billion.165 In
nearly every case, the excessive losses occurred when investment strate-
gies utilized derivatives to "bet" that interest rates would stay low. When
interest rates began to rise, these strategies failed. An examination of
some of the more prominent derivatives-related debacles follows.
1. Metallgesellschaft
One of the highest profile derivatives-induced disasters occurred at
Metallgesellschaft, Germany's fourteenth-largest industrial corporation,
whose subsidiary MG Corp. had estimated losses for 1993 of at least $500
million.166 Over the course of several years, MG entered into a series of
long-term, fixed-price contracts, agreeing to supply petroleum products
to various counterparties. The subsidiary failed, however, to negotiate
agreements to buy oil products in an amount sufficient to fulfill the sup-
ply contracts, leaving the subsidiary vulnerable to fluctuations in the price
of oil for at least some portion of the amount of product it had contracted
to supply to its counterparties. MG then purchased oil derivatives con-
tracts both on the OTC market and through organized exchanges, the
strategy being that an expected rise in the price of oil would create profits
through the derivatives which would offset the losses MG would take
buying high-priced oil to fulfill its supply contract obligations. Unfortu-
nately, the attempted hedge was improperly planned, and the derivatives
MG purchased were suitable hedges only for short-term oil price fluctua-
tions. When the spread between the long and short-term price of oil in-
creased, the derivatives MG had purchased as protection ended up
costing the company about $500 million, and may eventually run up $800
million in additional losses. 167
2. Orange County
In December of 1994, Orange County, California sent shock waves
through the U.S. financial markets. With its $7.4 billion investment fund
facing losses of $1.5 billion, the county filed for bankruptcy, the largest
such filing ever by a municipality. 168 Under the supervision of County
Treasurer Robert L. Citron, the County's fund were used in a highly
leveraged investment strategy that attempted to use interest-sensitive de-
165. Greenwald, supra note 3, at 54; see also Smith & Lipin, supra note 2, at Al; Spiro
et al., supra note 152, at 28. The $6 billion figure is probably a gross underestimate of the
losses suffered during this time frame. Recent derivatives-related losses by Orange County
and several other counties alone total nearly $2 billion. Id.
166. Loomis, supra note 6, at 50; see also Lindholm, supra note 5, at 88 & n.70.
167. Loomis, supra note 6, at 50. More recent reports have put the estimated loss as
high as $1.6 billion. William Glasgall & Greg Bums, Hedging Commandments, Bus. WK.,
Oct. 31, 1994, at 98, 99.
168. Spiro et al., supra note 152, at 28.
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rivative contracts to boost the funds yield. 169 Citron's operation has been
compared to a mutual fund that failed to reduce its share price to reflect a
stock market plunge. 170 Until relatively recently, Citron's fund, which of-
fered a return of between seven and eight percent annually, was an at-
tractive investment to recession-ridden local governments and public
entities whose primary alternative was a conservative state-run fund pay-
ing around four percent per year. 17'
Taking in approximately $7.5 billion from nearly 200 local governments
and agencies, Citron then borrowed aggressively, bringing the value of
the investment pool to $20 billion. 172 This money was then invested in
volatile structured notes issued by quasi-governmental agencies like the
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and Federal Home
Loan Banks, which effectively leveraged the entire pool by a factor of
three. 173 Citron had planned to earn around five percent on his base in-
vestment, and secure an enhanced yield on the leveraged portion of the
fund (around $14 billion) based on the difference between what the
bonds paid (five percent) and the cost of financing them (three per-
cent). 174 Unfortunately for Citron, his strategy relied on a bet that inter-
est would stay low; most of the funds derivatives were inverse floaters,
instruments whose yields move counter to market interest rates.175 The
strategy paid well while rates remained low, but when rates climbed, Cit-
ron's portfolio began to earn below market rates, forcing Citron to pay
more on the money he had borrowed than his fund could now earn. 176
When the Federal Reserve Board raised the discount rate in November,
Citron's pool could no longer sustain the cost of the leveraged portion of
its fund, and shortly thereafter the county filed for bankruptcy
protection. 77
In spite of the apparent red flag the Orange County bankruptcy raises
with respect to derivatives, some commentators have placed the blame on
Citron's management rather than on the financial instruments he used.
Critics fault Citron for failing to adjust the value of his securities in ac-
169. Id.
170. Andrew Bary, Peter Pan Portfolio: Orange County Bet That Interest Rates Would
Stay Low Forever, BARRON'S, Dec. 5, 1994, at 17. This disastrous loss will effect more than
Orange County alone, which held 37% of the portfolio. The Orange County Transporta-
tion Authority, with a 15% share, 37 school districts with an aggregate 13% share, and
numerous other Orange County public entities that, all told, held more than 90% of the
funds investments, will all feel financial pinch of the catastrophic investment. Id.
171. Id. Some municipalities were so impressed with the Citron pool that they sold




175. Id. A typical derivative held in the Citron portfolio would adjust based on the
following formula: 10 minus LIBOR (the London Interbank Offered Rate, discussed supra
note 77). This meant that when LIBOR was low, for example 3%, Citron's portfolio could
earn 7% on its derivatives. Id.




cordance with fluctuations in market interest rates.178 Citron's apparent
reliance on a never-ending period of low interest rates, coupled with a
mistaken "ya gotta believe" reporting technique, have led some to call his
investment the "Peter Pan Portfolio."'1 79 Others, however, claim the les-
son of the Orange County debacle is not that a fund manager used risky
derivatives to boost investment earnings, but rather that public funds,
which were thought by most county taxpayers to be invested conserva-
tively, were in fact being put at great risk in speculative trading.180 This
lack of proper disclosure, they claim, is a perfect example of why the
derivatives industry needs to be brought under a more stringent set of
regulatory requirements. 181
3. Bank of America
If federal regulators are uncomfortable with the type of losses de-
scribed above, they are terrified of derivatives horror stories such as the
one that recently took place at Bank of America. The bank was the spon-
sor of the Pacific Horizon Prime fund, a money-market fund that used
derivatives to boost its yield to well above the market average. The
fund's high yield was tied to derivatives issued by federal agencies, in-
cluding a $40 million interest in a five-year note which would not mature
until 1998. During the first year of the fund, the note paid an above-
market rate of 4.5%, but after the first year the rate was to be reset quar-
terly to reflect the higher of either 4.125% or 50% of the rate paid on ten-
year treasury-bills plus 1.25%. When interest rates began to rise, the
note's coupon rate was restricted, and its resale value was impaired. In-
vestors, attracted to better rates available elsewhere, began to withdraw
their money, shrinking the fund's assets by nearly half in one month's
time. Bank of America was forced to sell much of the note at a loss, and
it added nearly $70 million of its own money to this and one other fund to
prop up share prices.182 From the federal regulators' perspective, this sit-
uation is more serious than those that occurred at the big brokerage firms
like Piper Jaffray, because unlike the investment houses, the Bank of
America is a federally insured institution. The distinction is an important
one: in this instance, the losses at both the bank and the brokerage houses
were paid for out of shareholder equity, but if an FDIC-insured bank
failed because of derivatives it would be taxpayers, not shareholders, who
would ultimately pay the bill.' 83
178. Bary, supra note 170, at 17. Critics claim that when interest rates rose Citron did
what fund managers must never do: pretend that nothing was wrong. Id.
179. Id.
180. Waxman, supra note 3, at 3-4.
181. Id





In what might be the only derivatives-related disaster to achieve even
greater notoriety than the Robert Citron debacle in Orange County, a
twenty-eight-year-old futures trader managed to bring down a 230-year-
old investment bank in just a few weeks of reckless trading. 184 The
trader, Nick Leeson, operated out of the Singapore office of Barings Se-
curities Ltd., the trading arm of the venerable British merchant Barings
Bank. Leeson got into trouble buying and selling "straddle" futures tied
to the level of Japan's Nikkei 225 stock index-"betting," in effect, that
the market level would stay within a certain trading range.185 On January
17, 1995, an earthquake struck the city of Kobe, causing the Nikkei to
tumble-and Leeson's losses to mount.
In spite of the falling index, Leeson was confident the market would
soon stabilize, buying thousands of additional derivatives contracts in a
desperate "double-or-nothing"-style bet. 86 After several weeks of liter-
ally throwing good money after bad, Leeson's losses exceeded $1 billion.
The loss, more than twice Baring's available capital, left the bank, which
had financed the Louisiana Purchase, hopelessly insolvent. 187 Analysts
agree that Leeson's disastrous trades could never have occurred had Bar-
ings been diligent in its exercise of management control. 188
5. Other Derivatives-Related Losses
The well-publicized losses incurred by Metallgesellschaft, Orange
County, and Bank of America are merely the more high-profile examples
in what has become a stream of derivatives-related horror stories-sto-
ries which have set off alarms regarding the use and regulation of these
instruments. Corporate giants on the list of derivatives-induced losers in-
clude Procter & Gamble, with losses in 1994 of over $157 million; Glaxo
Holdings, 89 at approximately $115 million; Gibson Greetings of Ohio,
with more than $20 million in red ink; Dell Computer Corp., with an esti-
mated pre-tax loss of $35 million; Caterpillar Financial Services Corp., at
over $13 million; and Mead Corp., with a $12 million pre-tax loss. 190
Nor was the tide of red ink limited to big corporate players; Odessa
College of Texas put the bulk of its funds in derivatives and lost nearly
half of the $22 million invested.' 9 ' Prior to the disaster in Orange
County, municipalities throughout the country reported losses of millions
184. See Howard G. Chua-Eoan, Going for Broke: The Ego of a 28-Year-Old Trader
and the Greed of His 232-Year-Old Bank Combine to Destroy an Investment Empire, Stun-
ning the Business World, TIME, Mar. 13, 1995, at 40; Paula Dwyer, The Singapore Slinger: A
Cautionary Tale, Bus. WK., Jan. 15,1996, at 16; Floyd Norris, Market Watch: Is It Now Time
for Gun Control on Wall Street?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1995, § 3, at 1.
185. Dwyer, supra note 184, at 16; see also Chua-Eoan, supra note 184, at 40.
186. Nicholas Leeson; The Man Who Broke the Bank, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 1995, at 40.
187. Id.
188. See Dwyer, supra note 184, at 16; Norris, supra note 184, § 3, at 1.
189. Glaxo is a British pharmaceutical company. See Greenwald, supra note 3, at 54.
190. See Greenwald, supra note 3, at 54, 55; Beroza & McLaughlin, supra note 34, at 4.
191. Greenwald, supra note 3, at 54.
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of dollars, with more to come should interest rates continue to rise.192 In
December, Texas reported derivatives-related losses in its state invest-
ment pool of approximately $70 million, while the Florida's State Treas-
urer and San Diego County announced a combined loss of $550
million.193
Small, private investors, too, were shocked when they found the sup-
posedly conservative mutual funds into which they had placed their
money were actually based on portfolios heavy with derivatives. Over
the past year, funds run by major financial institutions like PaineWebber,
Kidder Peabody, and Bank America sustained unprecedented losses.' 94
In each instance, the firm prevented the loss from reaching its investors
by bailing out the bad investment with an influx of the firm's own
funds. 195 October of 1994 saw a $90 million fund run by Community As-
set Management, Inc. of Colorado set a precedent as the first money mar-
ket fund to shut down as a result of losses brought on by derivatives.
196
D. A QUESTION OF REGULATION
It is, therefore, less than happenstance that the recent flood of deriva-
tives-related red ink has coincided with an extreme interest on the part of
Congress and numerous federal regulatory agencies in the workings of
the derivatives industry.197 As a result of this heightened interest, a
growing controversy has ensued, pitting dealers and other members of
the financial industry (and even many regulators) against federal agencies
and policymakers in a battle to determine the regulatory future of deriva-
tive instruments.
The position of the financial market participants is clear: derivatives
are an invaluable tool to the industry, and the industry itself is both moti-
vated and well-equipped to avoid any "market meltdown" that deriva-
tives have the potential to induce. 198 As Mark Brickell, a derivatives
expert with J.P. Morgan put it, "It's in our own self-interest to make sure
192. Waxman, supra note 3, at 3.
193. Spiro et al., supra note 152, at 29.
194. Under similar circumstances, a Piper Jaffray & Co. prospectus enticed investors to
place their money in what was touted as a "low risk, triple-A-rated" fund known as the
Institutional Government Income Portfolio. When the Federal Reserve engineered a rise
in interest rates, this so-called safe investment began to bleed red ink because of the vola-
tile derivatives which accounted for over half the fund's assets. With the fund losing over
one quarter of its value in 1994 alone, Piper stemmed the loss by pouring in over $10
million of its own money as a "gesture of good will." See Greenwald, supra note 3, at 56;
Fink, supra note 8, at 91, 95; Smith & Lipin, supra note 2, at Al.
195. See Greenwald, supra note 3, at 54, 55. As of October, 1994, these firms had spent
more than half a billion dollars rescuing mutual funds whose values had plummeted be-
cause of derivatives. Id. at 54-55.
196. Fink, supra note 8, at 97. Investors in the fund (primarily institutional rather than
private investors) are the first to be saddled with losses a fund sponsor refused to absorb.
As a result, investors will collect only 94 cents for each dollar invested in the fund. Green-
wald, supra note 3, at 55.
197. See generally Beroza & McLaughlin, supra note 34, at 14.
198. See Loomis, supra note 6, at 41; Fink, supra note 8, at 97; Smith & Lipin, supra
note 2, at Al.
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that no big problems develop." 199 Certainly derivatives dealers would
suffer if the instruments did precipitate a large-scale financial crisis, not
only in terms of short-term profit losses, but also because over the long
term any such disaster would undoubtedly result in the passage of exactly
the type of stifling legislation the industry seeks to avoid. 200 Industry lob-
byists argue that additional regulatory legislation will not alter those
characteristics of the derivatives market with which the regulators are
concerned. They believe the industry as a whole will function in funda-
mentally the same manner, with one major difference-it will move off-
shore, and out of the reach of U.S. regulatory jurisdiction. Moreover, any
bill that imposes further restrictions on banks will send investors to deriv-
atives created by securities firms or other financial businesses whose ac-
tivities are less well regulated than those of banks.20 1 Thus, the net effect
of increased regulatory scrutiny, claim the derivatives proponents, will be
the unintended consequence of increasing the risks posed by
derivatives. 202
At the other end of the spectrum are the congressional committees
charged with overseeing the financial industry and protecting U.S. tax-
payers. A series of bills brought up during the 103rd congressional ses-
sion is indicative of Congress' concern over the state of the industry and
the magnitude of losses market participants have recently sustained. A
similar series of bills was presented to the 104th Congress during its re-
cently completed first session. One of the prime forces pushing for legis-
lative action has been Congressman James A. Leach (R-Iowa), who until
recently served as the ranking Republican on the House Banking Com-
mittee, now elevated to the Chairmanship. 20 3 Leach co-sponsored (along
with Committee Chairman Henry B. Gonzalez) the Derivatives Safety
and Soundness Supervision Act of 1994 (H.R. 4503),204 which proved to
be the closest thing to a viable derivatives-regulation bill put forward dur-
ing that legislative session.205 Although the bill was tabled at the last
199. Loomis, supra note 6, at 42.
200. Id.
201. Fink, supra note 8, at 94.
202. Id. at 95. That the derivative dealers are taking the legislative debate seriously is
evidenced by the lobbying effort the industry has mounted in Washington. The Interna-
tional Swaps and Derivatives Association, for example, has hired the premier Washington
lobbying firm of Patton & Boggs to represent its interests before Congress. See Smith &
Lipin, supra note 2, at Al.
203. Outgoing House Banking Committee Chairman Henry B. Gonzalez (D-Tex) has
also been a major proponent of legislative action to contain the risks posed by derivatives.
In November of 1994, Republicans captured control of both houses of Congress. At the
beginning of the new congressional session in January, 1995, Leach replaced Gonzalez as
chairman of the committee.
204. H.R. 4503, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1994).
205. The Derivatives Safety and Soundness Supervision Act of 1994 (H.R. 4503) was
scheduled for "mark-up" during September of 1994. At the urging of a bipartisan group of
House Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee members, Committee Chair Gon-
zalez canceled the subcommittee meeting, effectively halting the chance of passage of de-
rivatives legislation for the year. Insiders report that Gonzalez and bill co-sponsor Jim
Leach wanted to postpone action pending further study of the issues. Derivatives Disclo-
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minute, the redistribution of congressional power resulting from the mid-
term elections of 1994 make it more likely than ever that some form of
derivatives reform legislation will eventually become law. With Leach
now at the helm of the Banking Committee, it would be safe to presume
such legislation will reflect the key points of H.R. 4503.
Leach outlined the central provisions of the bill before a hostile audi-
ence of industry insiders at a securities industry conference in September
1994. The centerpiece of the bill was to have been the creation of an
interagency commission to devise appropriate accounting, disclosure, and
financial requirements20 6 for industry participants. 207 In addition, the bill
sought to augment the authority of federal regulators in supervision of
the derivatives industry, make corporate boards of directors and manag-
ers more accountable for the responsible use of the instruments, and en-
hance the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's power to manage
derivatives upon the insolvency of a financial institution. 208 In his speech,
Leach affirmed his belief that derivatives are "invaluable tools that are
being used effectively and prudently in a majority of circumstances, and
that limited problems require constrained solutions. '20 9 The tenor of this
language was far more conciliatory than Leach and other congressmen
had previously been prone to use in reference to derivatives. 210 Members
of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association had hoped that
Leach's softened rhetoric, coupled with the postponement of further ac-
tion on the bill, portended a "growing consensus that this legislation is
not needed. '211
Such an optimistic interpretation of these events on the part of the
swaps dealers appeared to have amounted, however, to so much wishful
thinking. Prior to the beginning of the new congressional session, incom-
ing Chairman Leach renewed his hostile rhetoric, while announcing that
derivatives legislation would be among the committee's top priorities in
the coming session.212 Leach went on to focus his remarks on the recent
derivatives disaster in Orange County, placing blame on both Congress
sure Legislation Dead for This Congressional Session, 26 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No.
1280 (1994).
206. The term "financial requirements" refers to the concept of setting standards with
respect to the amount of capital financial institutions have available to deal with potential
derivatives-related problems. See generally Fink, supra note 8, at 94.
207. Leach Explains His Derivatives Control Bill, AM. BANKER, Oct. 6, 1994, at 22.
208. Id.; see also Derivatives Safety and Soundness Supervision Act of 1994, H.R. 4503,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
209. Leach Explains His Derivatives Control Bill, supra note 207, at 22.
210. See Smith & Lipin, supra note 2, at Al.
211. Congress Puts off Legislation on Derivatives Until Next Year, INVESTMENT DEAL-
ERS' DIG., Sept. 26, 1994, at 7.
212. Leach Says House Banking Ready to Tackle Derivatives, supra note 12, at 906.
Leach noted that the Republican Party's "Contract With America" would dominate the
agenda during the first hundred days of the new session, but that derivatives and other
banking issues would be a part of his "phase I agenda." Id. In a later speech, Leach said
he would introduce derivatives oversight legislation on the first day of the new congress.
Incoming House Banking Chair Holds First Press Conference on His Agenda, 26 SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) No. 1711 (Dec. 23, 1994).
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and the administration for not pursuing the derivatives bill he introduced
during the prior legislative session.213 Referring again to Orange County,
Leach said the situation was symbolic of "what could become systemic
risk.1214 Leach has made it clear that the Republican-led House will not
be satisfied by promises from the SEC and others to produce guidelines
for derivatives dealers, leaving little room for doubt that some form of
new derivatives regulation is at hand.215 More recently, however, Leach
has backed off his aggressive pursuit of derivatives reform, focusing in-
stead on Glass-Steagall reform legislation and other banking issues.216
While Chairman Leach's intent, if not his timing, seems clear, not all in
Washington agree with him. The suggestion that no further regulation is
currently needed has received at least some support from all parties to
the regulatory debate, excepting, of course, Chairman Leach.217 Clearly
financial market players would like the current regulatory scheme to re-
main in place, but, more surprisingly, so would many financial regulators.
In fact, the Banking Committee members who helped convince Chairman
Gonzalez to delay further action on H.R. 4503 may now represent the
prevailing position in the regulatory debate-one which recognizes the
value of derivatives and seeks only to ensure their safe use with a minimal
amount of regulatory tinkering. This position seeks to strike a balance
between economic efficiency and proactive protection of the financial sys-
tem through measured regulation applied only after full and careful con-
sideration of the issues.218
The Clinton Administration has taken a similar hands-off approach to
the issue, as demonstrated by current Treasury undersecretary and soon-
to-be Treasury deputy secretary Frank Newman, who also urged Chair-
man Gonzalez to postpone action on H.R. 4503. In a letter to Gonzalez,
Newman wrote, "We acknowledge the complexities posed by derivatives
and the legitimate congressional interest in these important issues. In
light of the progress the private sector and financial regulators are mak-
213. Leach Says House Banking Ready to Tackle Derivatives, supra note 12, at 906.
Leach placed blame for the Orange County bankruptcy on "Washington's failure to pro-
vide adequate oversight of the derivatives market," claiming that "with regard to the Or-
ange County bankruptcy, blunt questions must be asked in and of Washington. Where was
the [Securities and Exchange Commission]? Where was Treasury? Where was Congress?"
Id.
214. Incoming House Banking Chair Holds First Press Conference on His Agenda,
supra note 212, at 1711.
215. Jeffrey Taylor & Albert R. Karr, Bank-Law Overhaul, Not Whitewater, to Be
House Panel Priority, Leach Says, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1994, at C19. Leach said his
legislation "would be friendly to the industry." Id.
216. U.S. Rep. Leach Says Derivatives Off Front Burner, REUTERS, Jan. 31, 1996.
217. Leach is not alone among prominent congressmen who are worried about the reg-
ulation of derivatives. Edward Markey, ranking Democrat on the House Telecommunica-
tions and Finance Committee, has also aggressively fought for rigid, mandatory regulation
of the industry. See 141 CONG. REC. E447-01 (daily ed. Feb. 1995) (statement of Rep.
Markey).
218. In their letter to Chairman Gonzalez, the congressmen expressed their opinion
that the American taxpayer would be better served if the committee took the time to more
fully understand the bill and the issues it addressed. Id.
19961
SMU LAW REVIEW
ing and the further progress we anticipate, the Administration has not
identified a need for legislation regarding derivatives at this time. '219
This position is echoed in comments by Federal Reserve Board Governor
Susan Phillips, who says there is no reason to believe that derivatives ac-
tivities are jeopardizing individual institutions or the stability of the finan-
cial system as a whole, and adds that internal procedures and risk
management techniques exist that can successfully contain the risks of
derivatives. 220 While Chairman Leach seems to be at least temporarily
comfortable with the regulatory regime, his pursuit of derivatives reform
will probably be revived in the near future. Whether Leach's next bill
will be tempered by the more moderate position adopted by industry
players and federal regulators-a position which seems to have gained
broad support- remains to be seen.
Perhaps the best snapshot of the current consensus with respect to de-
rivatives regulation is provided by the findings of the GAO in its study of
financial derivatives.221 Released in mid-May of 1994, the report was
prepared at the request of Congress for the benefit of both Congress and
the federal regulatory establishment. The report was based on an exhaus-
tive study of the global derivatives industry, including the results of nu-
merous other major derivatives studies as well as responses to extensive
survey questionnaires completed by market participants. The report con-
cluded with a series of recommendations, including a suggestion that new
legislation, both limited and focused in its scope, be passed to safeguard
the OTC market.2 22 The report emphasized the critical role derivative
instruments now play in the financial markets, but also noted that OTC
dealers were subject to few, if any, of the type of federal regulatory re-
quirements needed to ensure proper risk-management practices.2 23 To
remedy this regulatory gap, the GAO suggested enacting legislation
which would place non-bank OTC dealers under the authority of an ex-
isting regulatory agency, such as (but not necessarily) the SEC. Beyond
this immediate need, the report concluded that the sound use and man-
agement of derivatives was primarily the responsibility of the industry
players themselves, strong corporate oversight by boards of directors and
senior management being the key to preventing a financial market calam-
ity.224 To ensure such oversight actually occurs, the report suggested sev-
eral innovative steps which would facilitate proper risk-management by
219. Derivatives Disclosure Legislation Dead for This Congressional Session, supra note
205, at 1280. Newman excepted from his recommendation amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code relating to foreign exchange contracts. Id.
220. Oversight of Derivatives Moving at Acceptable Pace, 26 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) No. 38, at 1313, 1314 (Sept. 30, 1994).
221. GAO REPORT, supra note 22.
222. Id at 126-29.
223. Id. at 6. Unlike banks, OTC dealers are not subject to examination by federal
regulators, nor are they required to hold specific amounts of capital as a cushion against
potential derivatives-related losses. In addition, disclosure requirements for such firms are
far less stringent than those for banks performing the same or similar derivatives transac-




OTC dealers, including increased disclosure regarding derivatives activi-
ties, development of uniform capital requirements, implementation of a
uniform set of audit and internal control standards, and annual examina-
tion of all major dealers.225
IV. CONCLUSION
Derivative financial instruments have revolutionized the financial in-
dustry, providing both dealers and end-users with sophisticated risk-man-
agement capabilities and other benefits as well. Along with the rapid
expansion of the derivatives market has come the potential for substan-
tial disruptions, not only among individual market players but throughout
financial markets worldwide. The primary sources of this risk include the
sheer volume of the derivatives market, the interlinking of markets and
market participants, the lack of regulatory supervision of the OTC mar-
ket, and the concentration of derivatives activity among a relatively small
number of major dealers. Investors also face serious risks arising primar-
ily from a lack of sophistication and inadequate disclosure by dealers.
Recent large and highly publicized derivatives-related losses have height-
ened the ongoing debate over the need for stepped-up regulation of de-
rivative instruments. End-member parties to the debate include industry
players and many regulators, who want no additional regulation, and
members of Congress, who feel increased regulation is essential to the
protection of the financial system and the U.S. taxpayer. As of this writ-
ing, the consensus opinion among these parties as well as members of the
federal regulatory community seems to be in line with the findings of the
GAO, as summarized in its report on derivative instruments. Represent-
ing the middle-ground betWeen no action and heavy-handed legislation,
the report suggests placing relatively unsupervised OTC dealers under
the power of some existing regulatory agency, and implementing set stan-
dards with respect to accounting procedures, capital reserves, and corpo-
rate oversight within the OTC industry.
The watershed elections of 1994, which radically altered the congres-
sional balance of power, make it almost certain that derivatives legisla-
tion will eventually come out of the House Banking Committee. While
indications prior to the elections suggested that even ardent supporters of
derivatives legislation might have moderated their positions, Chairman
Leach of the House Banking Committee has made his intention to pass
some form of legislation clear. Leach and past Committee Chairman
Henry B. Gonzalez had sponsored a bipartisan derivatives bill during the
prior legislative session which was put on hold prior to the mid-term elec-
tions, but congressional sources speculate that a new bill will be much
broader and more detailed than prior efforts.226
225. Steve Cocheo, Push and Pull on Derivatives, 1994 ABA BANKING J. 10.
226. Leach Says House Banking Ready to Tackle Derivatives, supra note 12, at 906.
Insiders believe a new bill will be broader than previous bills as a result of the continuing
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The conventional wisdom, then, suggests that derivatives legislation
will be passed during the 104th Congress, and that the legislation will
most likely take a firmer regulatory stance than that reflected in the rec-
ommendations of the GAO report. Exactly what treatment Congress will
give the derivatives industry remains unknown, but it is certain that these
financial instruments will hold the attention of Congress for some time to
come.
derivatives-related losses experienced in the public sector. Sources expect the new legisla-
tion will emphasize suitability standards. Id.
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